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I. INTRODUCTION

Securities class actions are on the chopping block-again. Blueribbon commissions are claiming that increasing globalization
requires a fresh, hard look at the relationship between the markets,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and private rights
of action.' Change is inevitable. But these changes may be
disproportionate and ill-conceived, ignoring private securities class
actions' comparative institutional capability as a check against
agency capture, selective enforcement, and secret settlements. For
instance, these commissions recommend banning parallel private
and SEC fair funds actions,2 increasing arbitration's use,3 restricting
private securities class actions to insider trading cases, and allowing
only the SEC to pursue Rule 10b-5 violations.4 But these reforms
miss the point:
in the ongoing regulatory push and pull,
corporations are winning the battle.5

I

See generallyCoMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REG., THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC
EQUITY MARKET (2007), available at http'J/www.capmktsreg.org/pfsTheCompetitivePositi
on_of theUSPublicEquity Market.pdf (calling for decreased litigation and regulation,
coupled with increased shareholder rights, to remedy U.S. economy's competitive decline). See
also Arthur Levitt, Jr., The SEC at the Crossroads, 106 COLuM. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2006)
(suggesting that relationship between SEC, markets, and Congress needs to be reevaluated).
For an overview of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation's plan, commonly known as
"Paulson's Plan," see Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
Chairman: Opening Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting (July 25, 2007), availableat httpJ/
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch072507cc.htm ("[Sihareholders ofU.S. companies have fewer
rights in a number of important areas than do their foreign competitors, giving foreign firms a
competitive advantage."); Steve Zwick, The Green, Green Grass of Europe, FUTURES MAG.,
Aug. 1, 2007, at 62, 64. For additional analysis of these reports, see James D. Cox, Randall S.
Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffsand... There Are Plaintiffs: An EmpiricalAnalysis
of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 358-65 (2008).
2 See JONATHAN C. DICKEY, PRACTISING LAW INST., CURRENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES LITIGATION 14-16 (2007), availableat http:/www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Do
cuments/Dickey-SecuritiesLitigationAndEnforcementInstitute2007.pdf(discussing proposals by
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation and Commission on Regulation of U.S. Capital
Markets in the 21st Century, which both called for limiting effect of these parallel actions).
3 See id. at 16-17 (summarizing proposal by Bloomberg-Schumer Report calling
for
strengthened arbitration).
" See id. at 17-18 (discussing proposal by "Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee,"
which called for federal legislation limiting securities class actions and SEC enforcement
power).
5 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (2003) ("In
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It is true that the securities class action is not a perfect regulator.
It is equally true, however, that its role in expost regulation through
litigation allows the United States to maintain its attractiveness as
a relatively deregulated market with relaxed ex ante barriers and
low market entry costs.6 Moreover, restricting the securities class
action's availability makes it the latest casualty in the ongoing trend
toward winnowing public adjudication.7 Arbitration, mediation, and
administrative proceedings have replaced judicial hearings, trials,

the post-Enron, post-Sarbanes-Oxley debate over the United States's seemingly dysfunctional
system of corporate governance, Congress, the SEC, and the public at large all suspect that,
when sophisticated financial chicanery occurs, lawyers are typically present 'at the scene of
the crime.' "). For a corporate lawyer's view of the current securities litigation environment,
see Our Forbidding Litigation Environment Can Be Changed, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL,
July 2007, at 6 (publishing interview with James C. Dugan, Partner, Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, regarding securities litigation system).
6 See Samuel Issacharoff, RegulatingAfter the Fact,56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 385 (2007)
("Ex post accountability is the prerequisite for ex ante liberalization."); William B.
Rubenstein, On What a "PrivateAttorney General" Is-and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L.
REv. 2129, 2149-50 (2004) ("Private attorneys may be better at [discerning or pursuing
private wrongdoing] for a variety of reasons-because public attorneys may be fewer in
number, underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political pressures."); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 227, 247-48 (2007) ("When so many agencies are understaffed and unable to enforce
existing law, the private right of action is more important than ever in ensuring that unsafe
practices and products are identified and kept out of the market." (quoting Letter from
Representative Jan Schakowsky to President George W. Bush (Feb. 16, 2006))).
' See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 211, 212 (1995) (providing less optimistic
forecast on array of state decision making options that will be available to future litigants);
Judith Resnik, ProceduralInnovations, Sloshing Over: A Comment on DeborahHensler,A
Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass
Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1633-34 (1995) (discussing willingness of
judges to try mass tort cases as part of movement away from individual adjudication); Judith
Resnik, Whither and WhetherAdjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2006) [hereinafter
Resnik, Wither and Whether] ("During the past thirty years, adjudication's reach has been
constrained-in part through requiring alternatives and in part by devolving much of the
work of courts to administrative agencies and private providers."). "Adjudication" has been
defined in numerous ways. Geoffrey Hazard defined the term:
A procedure for determining a dispute involving a claim of legal or
customary right in which a third party is invested with authority to make
a decision that is recognized as binding, except that under some systems
of adjudication the parties have a right to reach a different disposition by
contract after an adjudication.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 319, 319 (1979). For purposes of this Article, I narrow this definition of "adjudication"
by excluding processes that are not appealable to a state or federal court within the United
States.
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and open records.8 Transparency and accountability for public law
matters has been lost in the shift. 9
Traditional litigation's public function is so common as to be
under-theorized: transparent adjudication through securities class
actions holds both the government and corporations publicly
responsible. But securities class actions do more than this. Their
pursuit has spillover effects-positive externalities-including
innovation, deterrence, information sharing, accountability, and
transparency. ° These spillovers benefit more than parties to a
lawsuit; they benefit the public.
Still, most commentators view class actions with suspicion; they
see class suits as nonmeritorious byproducts of self-interest and the
attorneys who bring them as rent-seekers." Yet the full picture and
texture of securities class actions also necessitate a pragmatic
positive account. This Article provides that account and thus fills
a significant gap in the benefit side of cost-benefit literature. To do
so, however, it self-consciously begins with a controversial
assumption: securities class actions can be valuable. Naturally, I

See infra Part III.D.
9 See infra Part IV.A.

On the notion of 'spillovers," Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley explain:
Spillover benefits aren't intentionally provided.... Instead, they are
incidental "extras'--they spill over to others as a result of decisions you
and we... made for our own purposes. While seemingly insignificant to
us, spillovers turn out to be enormously significant to society. We are all
incidental beneficiaries, each and every day. Spillovers "are a ubiquitous
boon for society" because we share a common environment, live in
communities, and interact with one another.
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259 (2007)
(footnote omitted).
" E.g., Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics
Inc.: ShareholderWealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretationof the PrivateSecurities
LitigationReform Act's PleadingStandard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 782-84 (2000) (arguing
that plaintiffs' lawyers have incentive to file frivolous lawsuits); Martin H. Redish, Class
Actions and the DemocraticDifficulty: Rethinking the Intersectionof PrivateLitigation and
Public Goals, 2003 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (2003) (contending that class litigation "amounts
10

to little more than private attorneys acting as bounty hunters"); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass

Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1228, 1231 (1995) (noting existence of "sell-out
lawyers who, for millions in fees, are willing to sign away the rights of tens of thousands of
faceless and lawyerless class members"); Adam C. Pritchard, CongressShould Not Repeal the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, USA TODAY, Sept. 2003, at 18, 20 (arguing that
increase in securities fraud class actions may be explained by fact that "plaintiffs' lawyers
simply are filing more suits in the hope that a few will 'stick'").
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harbor no illusion that the securities class action always functions
optimally. It doesn't. I have written elsewhere about ways to
optimize its public function and cabin its negative externalities, but
leave those issues for another day.1 2 That allows me to focus here
on the respective institutional capacities of private and public
actors. To do so, I admittedly construct a false dichotomy between
the two actors and between securities class actions as socially
productive versus economically destructive. Politics drives that
decision; it polarizes the debate. Thus, I frame this alternative
account likewise.
Part II begins by explaining America's response to the challenge
of institutional design.
America's choice, using ex post
regulation-consequence-based regulation-as opposed to heavy ex
ante constraints on market entry, attracts new businesses, fosters
competition, and supports economic growth. Still, engineering
optimal enforcement requires an understanding and assessment of
comparative institutional abilities. For instance, importing and
adapting Oliver Williamson's "Selective Intervention Puzzle" to
enforcement design prompts questions such as, "Why can't the SEC
do everything that private attorneys general can and vice versa?" 3
As this Article explores, the short answer is that public and private
institutions have unique incentives, goals, and obstacles.
Integrating both public and private actors into ex post enforcement
diminishes collective action dilemmas, agency inaction, and private
resolution of public law matters through arbitration. But regulation
through litigation, particularly class litigation, has its share of
critics. Consequently, after highlighting this regulatory scheme, I
reevaluate quintessential criticisms that perpetuate standard

12 See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ReassessingDamages in Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348 (2007) (arguing that limiting investors to out-of-pocket
losses will maximize deterrence and enforcement functions of securities class actions).
'3 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 150 (1996); see also Ilya R.
Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Public vs. PrivateEnforcement ofAntitrust Law: A Survey 3-4
(John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 335, 2006),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=952067 (adapting Williamson's "Selective Intervention
Puzzle" to enforcement systems to ask "why we can't always replicate the incentives ofprivate
parties in a private litigation system by channeling private complaints through a public
enforcement agency").
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rhetoric about class actions as both a species of aggregate
litigation-including allegations about frivolous lawsuits, ineffective
attorney monitoring, and failure to pursue unattractive cases-and
as a securities enforcement tool. Critics arguing the latter posit that
securities class actions cause foreign firms to avoid United States
listings14 and force diversified investors to pay high transaction
costs to transfer wealth from one pocket to the other. 15
After addressing those concerns and finding many of them less
probletaatic than critics claim, Part III assesses what is, for many,
a counterfactual assertion: securities class actions benefit society.
By supplementing ex post enforcement, securities class actions
produce positive externalities-spillover effects-that confer public
advantages such as innovation, cost-reduction through information
sharing, deterrence, transparent judicial process, and both corporate
and enforcement accountability. Because any attempt to assign
numerical values to these externalities is inherently artificial, I opt
instead to weigh them in terms of fulfilling social objectives and
democratic norms. These objectives and norms include: forming
rules through adjudication, maintaining open fora for debating
appropriate sanctions, facilitating access to the courts, and
respecting litigants' preference for traditional adversarial
adjudication.
Restricting the securities class action's use
undermines these objectives. Consequently, its worth is perhaps
best gauged through indignation over the consequences following its
departure. Part IV thus envisions the ramifications of eliminating
securities class actions by imagining a world with governmentcentric securities enforcement. That world, I contend, is one steeped
in bureaucracy, one failing to produce behavior-guiding precedent,
one filled with closed-door arbitrations, one neglecting
nonprioritized misconduct, and one ignoring litigant preference for
judicial process.'" That world is one severe enough to outweigh my
lingering doctrinal and jurisprudential concerns about securities

14

See infra note 98 and accompanying text.

15 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
16

This imagined world is not as far-fetched as it might seem. See infra note 239 and

accompanying text.
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class actions. In short, it is a world less preferable than our current
system-flawed though it is.
II. PRIVATIZING Ex POST SECURITIES REGULATION
Flaws and all, securities regulation currently assumes that, left
to their own devices, executives will lie about or conceal information
to promote their own self-interest. 7 Consequently, the pivotal
regulatory question is not whether America should contihue to
regulate, but how: through ex ante barriers to market entry or ex
post consequence-based regulation through litigation.
A AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION

Recent economic literature on productive economies, securities
markets, and entry barriers favors the latter consequence-based
approach. 8 After analyzing bureaucratic entry hurdles in eightyfive countries and ranking the United States in the top quartile in
terms of simple market entry for start-up businesses, economists
established a correlation between monetary wealth and easy market
entry. 9 On the other hand, onerous ex ante regulation-the
"tollbooth view" of extracting rents-coincided with greater
corruption and an underground economy, but not with superior
goods.' This high correlation between corruption, entry barriers,

17 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, SecuritiesRegulation by Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 152-53 (1990) (arguing that "disturbing
departure from ethical norms" in 1980s led to increased securities law enforcement and
regulation).
s See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
19 See Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 16-22 (2002)
(ranking bureaucratic entry hurdles by number of procedures and days to obtain the requisite
permits and ultimately concluding that "[riich countries... regulate entry relatively less than
do all the other countries"); see also Howell E. Jackson, Variationin the Intensity ofFinancial
Regulation: PreliminaryEvidence and PotentialImplications 3 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law,
Econ., and Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), availableat httpJ/ssrn.
com/abstract=839250 (arguing that contrary to expectations, common law countries such as
United States have "markedly higher levels of regulatory intensity" than civil law regimes).
' Djankov et al., supranote 19, at 35.
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and mediocre products does little to commend a system centered on
market entry.2 '
This is why, as Sam Issacharoff observes, the United States
"regulate[s] not entry but consequences."2 2 Securities laws, as
public laws, thus establish affirmative corporate disclosure
obligations and delineate rules for enforcing them through
litigation.2" These laws protect the investing public by maintaining
the integrity of information about publicly traded companies and by
insulating the American economy from insider abuse. 24 The
regulatory question thus becomes a structural one: which
institutions-public, private, or some amalgamation of the
two-should bear enforcement responsibilities?2 5
Designing optimal enforcement requires both an understanding
and assessment of various institutional capabilities.26 For example,
21 See Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, & Rita Ramalho, Regulation and Growth 3 &

n.4 (Mar. 17, 2006), availableat http'//ssrn.com/abstract=893321 (observing high correlation
between corruption and business regulations index and noting that countries with less
burdensome regulations experience faster economic growth); see, e.g., Bernard S. Black &
Anna S. Tarassova, InstitutionalReform in Transition:A Case Study of Russia, 10 SuP. CT.
ECON. REV. 211, 244-52 (2003) (observing ways that regulatory corruption harms small
business in Russia, including burdens of obtaining permits from 20-30 agencies and
completing 50-90 approved registration forms).
2 Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 377; see also Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 156
(observing that it is easier for SEC to pursue visible enforcement actions than to develop
comprehensive regulations).
' See Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer, PrivateEnforcement of PublicLaws: A Theory
of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 398,400 (1998) ("Unlike the private rules, public laws are
public, and hence private enforcers can free ride on them to structure their own activities, and
to create their own reputations.").
' E.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985)
(observing that securities law aims for "protection of the investing public and the national
economy through the promotion of'a high standard ofbusiness ethics... in every facet of the
securities industry' " (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963))); Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The major
objective of the federal securities law is undoubtedly to provide protection to the investing
public.").
' See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOzO L. REv. 2517, 2521 (2008) (noting that private litigation is viable alternative to
costly government regulation). There are a myriad of options available when mixing private
and public enforcement. For a survey of possible permutations in the parallel context of
environmental regulation, see David L. Markell & Tom Tyler, Using EmpiricalResearch to
Design Government Citizen ParticipationProcesses: A Case Study of Citizens' Roles in
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2008)
(manuscript at 9-10, on file with author), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1006750.
2 See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a
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consider Friedrich Hayek's famous proposal that reporting first to
a centralized authority before acting hinders societal adaptation,
whereas decentralization ensures that the "man on the spot" can
immediately use specific circumstantial knowledge to society's
benefit." Private investors suffering the financial consequences of
fraud often have superior knowledge about the injury,2 8 and their
profit-seeking motive makes them more efficient than their
bureaucratic counterpart.2" On the other hand, SEC experts
cultivate information channels of their own. They can also readily
discover more information through subpoenas and discovery by
imposing sanctions or threatening to submit the case to the
Department of Justice for criminal enforcement."
These relative institutional strengths spawned two divergent
theories about what works best in securities regulation. Adherents
to both agree that "law matters," but they differ over design. 3 ' One
theory posits that by tailoring contract and tort law, securities law
reduces the transaction costs of establishing private liability;32 the
other views securities laws as creating and developing coercive
obligations for producing information to a public authority, such as

DeregulatoryEra, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1616 (2003) (using institutional choice to evaluate
litigation's use in electric utility tariffs).
2 F.A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945).
See Segal& Whinston, supranote 13, at4 ("[P]rivate individuals utilize their extensive
knowledge of 'specific circumstances of time and place,' which would be impossible to
communicate to a central authority.").
29 See id. at 5 ("The public sector is generally less efficient than private, because it is not
driven by the profit motive.").
30 See id. ("A public enforcer has a lower cost of information discovery since it can use
the power of the state."); see also Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez De Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws? 4 (Tuck Sch. of Bus. at Dartmouth, Working
Paper No. 03-22, 2003), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=425880 (arguing that public
enforcers can secure information more effectively than private plaintiffs).
"
La Porta, De Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 30, at 3.
Id. at 3-4. See generally Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model
of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) (arguing for "self-enforcing model of
corporate law" in emerging economies); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, A Reason for
Quantity Regulation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 431 (2001) (advocating efficiency through quantity
regulations as motivation for law enforcement); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal
Origins,117 Q. J. ECON. 1193(2002) (examining relationship between economic development
and common law system of governance); Hay & Shleifer, supra note 23, at 398 (discussing
correlation between legal system and economic development); Jonathan R. Hay, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Toward a Theory of Legal Reform, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 559
(1996) (proposing reforms whereby legal rules would accommodate existing business practice).
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the SEC, plus constructing sanctions for noncompliance. 33 Put
simply, the divisive issue is who should enforce securities
laws-private market participants or public government actors.
An empirical study conducted in part by Rafael La Porta
answered this question by examining securities laws governing
initial public offerings in forty-nine countries. 34 After evaluating
several hypotheses including doing nothing, using securities laws to
reduce transaction costs in private enforcement, or relying on public
enforcement to secure information and impose sanctions,3 5 the study
concluded that "efficient institutional choice takes the form of
private enforcement of public rules, which encourages private
recovery of damages."3 6 In other words, private enforcement works
best in securities regulation because it is the most efficient
approach. Issuers, distributors, and accountants are the lowest cost
providers; securities laws make investor recovery less expensive
through mandatory disclosure requirements and liability rules.37
Consequently, broad, mandatory disclosure requirements and light
burdens of proof strongly correlated with more developed stock
markets.3 8
Evidence from other industries such as waste collection, electric
utilities, and mail services demonstrates that government-provided
services cost between 30% and 90% more than those the private
sector provides. 39 This data, coupled with evidence that private
enforcement is more efficient, suggests that we have systematically

3 La Porta, De Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 30, at 4. See generally Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (introducing
economic analysis of optimal levels of punishment necessary to deter crime); Edward L.
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401
(2003) (examining and analyzing appropriate law enforcement institutions for transition
economies and emerging markets); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic
Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000) (modeling
mechanisms for efficient public enforcement of laws).
La Ports, De Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 30, at 4.
Id. at 2-4.
3
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
37

Id. at 8.

8 Id. at 16-17.
3 MICHAEL J.TREBaILOCK, THE PROSPECTS FOR REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 21-22 (1994);
Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatizationand Accountability, 116 HARv.
L. REV. 1422, 1429 (2003).
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undervalued the advantages of coupling privatization with public
enforcement.40 Plus, private enforcement avoids the possibility of
government failure.4
Because private securities class actions are synonymous with
private enforcement, these findings suggest that narrowing their
function may handicap optimal enforcement. The findings also
indicate that increasing government enforcement through the SEC
is a second-best substitute.42 In short, securities class actions can
provide a cost-effective, private procedural vehicle to vindicate
substantive public rights within a society skeptical of centralized
government.43
Even though the notion of private attorneys supplementing public
enforcement is hardly a fresh idea, its controversial nature has not
diminished with time. 44 The basic idea is this: private attorneys,
o See Glaeser & Shleifer, supranote 33, at 421 ("[Slocieties with the highest levels of law
and order should rely on private litigation rather than regulation. The reason for this is that
the liability system-as long as it is not subverted--can achieve first best efficiency, whereas
regulation alone never can."). Of course, the crux of the question is whether innovation and
creativity likewise creates perverse incentives such as undermining legislative policy or

moving litigation to more hospitable foreign forums. One need only look to popular news
accounts for this perspective. E.g., ShareholderLawsuits: A Blazing Summer, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 13, 2005, at 61 ("The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was meant to curb
frivolous class-action suits within the field of securities law. But in forcing class-action
lawyers to raise their game, it has contributed to a new era of big lawsuits and even bigger
settlements."). I provide the alternative perspective in Part III and should note that not all
accounts are anti-securities class action. E.g., Sandra Rubin, A New Haven for Class Acts,
GLOBE & MAIL, June 13, 2007, at 310 ("While a certain amount of skepticism about class
actions--particularly securities class actions--has been creeping into the American
jurisprudence, in Canada, where we are still in the early part of our history in class actions,
that's not been a phenomenon."); see also ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE

AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 100-04 (2001) (highlighting two faces of American legalism and
providing both positive and negative account of private attorneys acting in quasigovernmental capacity).
41 See Burch, supra note 25, at 2521 (noting that decentralized enforcement and private
class actions free individuals from governmental dependence).
42 See id. at 2541; Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 33, at 421 ("[Slocieties with the highest
levels of law and order should rely on private litigation rather than regulation .... [because]
the liability system.., can achieve first best efficiency, whereas regulation alone never can.").
' KAGAN, supra note 40, at 125 ("[Adversarial legalism] persisted because of a political
tradition that is mistrustful of bureaucratic authority-preferring to fragment authority and
to hold it legally accountable through individually activated rights and adversarial
litigation."); Burch, supra note 25, at 2522-23.
" See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action "Cops": Public Servants or Private
Entrepreneurs?,57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2005) (noting public's increased disillusionment
with class action practice).
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working for private clients (often corporate shareholders or pension
funds), who pursue their own litigation also promote public interest
and policy, thereby buttressing the government's enforcement
efforts.4 5 Granted, private interests may not perfectly align with
public interests, but as this Article explores, a substantial overlap
exists even in misaligned cases. Definitionally, although the private
attorney general is ostensibly characterized in contrast with the
government attorney, this archetypal dichotomy ignores the nuances
of each.4 6 Rather, private attorneys general fluctuate along a
continuum, serving both private and public functions at various
times.4 7
Private aggregation combined with contingency fees deputizes
plaintiffs' attorneys to initiate cases that the SEC and exchanges
either overlook or lack the budget to bring.' Conversely, the SEC
and exchanges operate as failsafe enforcement for economically
inefficient actions, i.e., actions where litigation costs exceed

'

See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2146.
See Burch, supra note 25, at 2524 (noting continuum between private attorneys
general and government enforcement); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2132 (same).
47 Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2132. Professor Rubenstein likens the private attorney
general concept to Alfred Kinsey's taxonomy of sexual orientations and points out that
"[t]here are not just two pure forms-the private attorney on the one hand and the
government attorney on the other-but rather an array of mixes of the public and private."
Id. I
Michael A. Perino, Didthe PrivateSecurities
LitigationReformAct Work?, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REv. 913, 918. Both the courts and the SEC agree that private litigation generally helps
deter wrongdoing. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350, 376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that private suits constitute important
enforcement tool); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)
(emphasizing importance of implied private actions in enforcement of securities laws); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) ("[P]rivate enforcement of
Commission rules may '[provide] a necessary supplement to Commission action.' "(quoting
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))); Private Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing& UrbanAffairs, 103d Cong. 111 (1993) (statement ofWilliam R. McLucas, Director,
Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) ("Although the
Commission devotes substantial resources to the detection and prosecution of securities law
violations, private actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 serve
as the primary vehicle for compensating defrauded investors. Private actions also provide
additional deterrence against securities law violations.").
Contingency fees generally range from 20% to 30% of the class recovery through either
settlement or trial. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:
BalancingFairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Cmi. L. REv. 877, 889-90
(1987). The court must, however, approve the fee under Rule 23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1).
4
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damages. 49 Thus, there is a need for interdependence and overlap
among private and public enforcement.5"
Despite this need, corporations are quick to criticize American
litigation as abusive, dubbing securities class actions a form of
legalized blackmail.5 So perceptions assume a reality of their own.
There are, to be sure, occasional strike suits that settle for nuisance
value.52 But perhaps we should expect this in an enforcement
system relying primarily on decentralized, self-motivated private
actors.5 3 Class actions, as compared with hundreds of individual
claims or even fractional aggregation, are a cost-effective means for
exploiting scale economies.5 4 Absent a certified class action,
collective action problems would plague enforcement objectives and

" See Segal & Whinston, supra note 13, at 9 (suggesting that reducing socially wasteful
litigation may be accomplished by not awarding damages for actions that are socially
efficient).
° See Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,547
(2000) (noting symbiotic relationship between public and private actors in regulatory
contexts). Even Congress has conceded that private securities litigation furnishes "an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to
rely upon government action." H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730; see also Perino, supranote 48, at 918 (noting that by adopting
PSLRA, Congress expressly adopted view that requiring entities, which commit securities
fraud, to pay damages can deter future violations).
"' See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, FederalCourts Should
Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call For Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction
Reform, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 483,491 (2000) (noting that several courts have described class
actions as form of blackmail); Charles Silver, "We're Scaredto Death": Class Certificationand
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357, 1363 (2003) (discussing view that class settlements are
"legalized blackmail"); see also L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Note, Between "MeritInquiry" and
"RigorousAnalysis". Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action
Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1084 (2004) (explaining that class actions can
pressure defendants to settle even where plaintiffs' cases are weak).
" See Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 1, at 385 (observing that 20.5% of settlements
examined are below $2 million but theorizing that "[blecause this set represents only a
distinct minority of the cases, . . . it hardly makes the case for wholesale reform of the
securities class action').
' See Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 384-85. Some commentators have called for reform
of the plaintiffs' bar in light of its role as a decentralized regulator. See, e.g., John Fabian
Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the
Governanceof the Tort System, 56DEPAuLL. REv. 261,262-63 (2007) (seeking ways to realize
benefits ofprivate enforcement while constraining plaintiffs' bar's discretionary authority and
reducing associated agency costs).
" See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1465, 1522 (2004) (arguing that aggregation of claims makes such claims more
manageable and economical).
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undermine the benefits achieved through the ex post regulatory
scheme, namely the value of ex ante deterrence."5 Forgetting the
regulatory advantages is easy when corporations focus exclusively
on the back-end. But the front-end picture boasts a robust economy
unsaddled with bureaucratic barriers.5 6 It embraces the idea that
minimal ex ante interference enhances market freedom and
innovation: in return for regulating consequences, we gain novel
products, new businesses, competitive pricing, and employment
opportunities, all generally unobstructed by ex ante constraints.5 7
Both pictures-simple market entry and heavy litigation-accurately
depict securities regulation, but only when viewed together.
B. REASSESSING NORMATIVE CRITICISMS

Still, critics maintain that aggregation's benefits do not outweigh
its costs.5" Commentators, myself included, and recent commissions
have fashioned securities class actions into the poster child for
reform with maxims about strike suits and rent-seeking plaintiffs'
attorneys.5" Invoking these maxims, however, ignores securities
class actions' positive pragmatic side and may underestimate the

"6 See David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 244, 246 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) ("Only class action aggravates all
mass production tort claims to provide the opportunity for fully exploiting economies of
litigation scale that ensure maximum regulatory, optimal deterrence benefit from mass
production tort liability.").
' See Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 385 (noting relative ease in United States of bringing
new products to market and describing business environment as "a robust economy
generating both opportunity and wealth"); Richard A. Epstein, Lessons from the Labor
Markets, CHIEF EXECUTIVE MAG., July 1, 2007, at 59, available at 2007 WLNR 16013780
("U.S. capital markets... are freer now than they were 50 years ago.").
"7 Burch, supranote 25, at 2523 (claimingthat private enforcement mechanisms generate
more innovation than government enforcers); see also Epstein, supra note 56, at 59 ("The
great engine of U.S. economic productivity rests on the ability of employers and workers to
set mutually agreeable terms on wages and conditions, largely without state intervention.");
Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 385 (noting relative ease of doing business in United States
because of minimal bureaucratic interference).
' See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrenceand Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006) ("[The conclusion
seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly.").

" See, e.g., Burch, supra note 25, at 2519 (admitting class actions are "not perfect
regulators"); Dickey, supra note 2, at 730, 736-39 (examining securities litigation reform
proposals of several commissions).
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effects of recent amendments to both securities laws and Rule 23.
Perhaps the traditional drawbacks are no longer as costly.
Consequently, I reassess conventional understanding to discredit
myths, direct debate toward persistent problems, and, in the
remainder of the Article, couch these problems within the
advantages of ex post regulation.
Normative criticism of securities regulation through the class
action mechanism collapses into two principal categories: systemic
assaults on the class action as a procedural joinder device6" and
context-specific criticism of "securities" class actions.61 Reforms
remedied some concerns in the former category. The problem now
is this: those reforms overcorrected the securities class action and
decreased both nonmeritorious and meritorious litigation.62 In a
system relying heavily on ex post regulation, this weakens the
regulatory bite and suggests that reformists proceed cautiously lest
the law of unintended consequences reign.
1. Species-DependentClass Action Criticism. Popular normative
criticisms distill into three primary contentions: (1) frivolous claims
exhort undue settlement pressure on innocent companies; (2)
collective representation makes effective attorney monitoring
unlikely; and (3) the plaintiffs' bar is entrepreneurial and selfserving so it fails to pursue economically unattractive cases, leaving
gaps in ex post enforcement.63 I address each argument in turn.
First, despite pervasive perceptions about corporate "blackmail"
and frivolous claims, procedural devices weed out most securitiesrelated nuisance suits, thereby alleviating settlement pressure.

60 Redish, supra note 11, at 74.
"' See Coffee, supranote 58, at 1534 ("[S]ecurities class actions disproportionately assert
'frivolous' claims ....
[and] systematically overcompensate .... "); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in Class Action and DerivativeLitigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CIE. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991)
(criticizing lack of client monitoring in securities class actions).
62 Choi, supra note 54, at 1472 ("While the PSLRA may very well reduce the impact of
frivolous litigation, however, the Act may also work to chill meritorious litigation."); Stephen
J. Choi, Karen K Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the Private Securities
LitigationReform Act 2 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law and Econ., Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper
No. 07-008, 2007), available at http'//ssrn.com/abstract-975301 (suggesting that PSLRA
barriers may have also discouraged meritorious litigation).
63 See infra notes 67, 74, 85 and accompanying text.
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These devices include typical quality control procedures available in
every civil case: Rule 11 sanctions," Rule 12 motions to dismiss for
failing to state a claim,6" and Rule 56 motions for summary
judgment.6 6 Heightened pleading standards in securities fraud
actions contribute to a 39.1% dismissal rate at this early litigation
phase.6" Plus, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)
stays discovery until courts resolve motions to dismiss, which
further diminishes costs. 68 The court must also assess whether to
sanction plaintiffs' counsel for bringing frivolous claims in every
securities fraud case.6 9 Yet, curiously, this sanction is rarely used.7"
In the ten-year period after the PSLRA's enactment, courts
sanctioned plaintiffs' attorneys in only four reported cases-an
If
average of one every two-and-a-half years nationwide.7 1
widespread securities-related strike suits exist, one would expect
heavier reliance on this provision.72 Similarly, research indicates

64 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (authorizing courts to impose sanctions against parties or
attorneys filing frivolous lawsuits).

61FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).

66 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
67 TODD FOSTER ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS STAY LOW AND AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS STAY HIGH-BUT

ARE THESE TRENDS REVERSING? 7 (Sept. 2007), availableat http://www.nera.com/image/PUB
RecentTrendsSep2007_2color web-FINAL.pdf. This number reflects cases dismissed on
a motion to dismiss between 2006 and 2007. Id. It has increased substantially from 19.4%
of cases between 1991 and 1995. Id. Moreover, "the annual likelihood of a suit has
fallen 27%." Id.; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)
(2006) (requiring plaintiffs to "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief,. . . [plaintiffs] shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed").
6
Securities Act of 1933 § 27(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b) (2006).
69 See id. § 77z-1(c) (requiring courts to record specific findings regarding parties' and
attorneys' compliance under Rule 11); id. § 78u-4(c) (requiring mandatory imposition of
sanctions on parties and attorneys in violation of Rule 11).
70 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1508 (2006)
("Despite the recurring use of adjectives like 'mandatory,' 'specific,' and 'each' in the sanction
provision and the hundreds of class actions brought since the Act was enacted, we find that
the sanction provision has been little used as a weapon against possibly abusive class
actions."); see also Hartmarx Corp. v. Abboud, 326 F.3d 862, 872 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing
imposition of sanctions under PSLRA).
71 Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1508-09.
72 It is true, however, that courts have interpreted this provision consistently with
Rule 11 and, in so doing, have noted that "such sanctions are to be imposed sparingly, as they
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that the settlement size of most claims closely correlates with
evidence of fraud, such as insider trading and accounting
restatements.73
Second, citing collective action and free rider problems,
commentators allege that class litigation permits plaintiffs'
attorneys "to operate with nearly total freedom from traditional
forms of client monitoring."7 4 While traditional monitoring is absent
in class litigation, Rule 23 supplies a surrogate: judicial oversight.
Judges appoint class counsel, approve settlement terms, and
authorize attorneys' fees.7 5 Again, the PSLRA augments attorney
monitoring in securities fraud class actions. It does so in two ways:
(1) it entreats sophisticated institutional investors to serve as lead
plaintiffs either in lieu of or alongside individual class
representatives; 76 and (2) it compels affirmative judicial vigilance in
reviewing and sanctioning attorney misconduct.7 7

can 'have significant impact beyond the merits of the individual case' and can affect the
reputation and creativity of counsel." Hartmarx, 326 F.3d at 867 (quoting Pac. Dunlop
Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 118 (7th Cir. 1994)).
" Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More?
The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 630
(2007) ("Our evidence suggests a closer relation between factors related to fraud and
securities class actions after the passage of the PSLRA .... ").
74 Macey & Miller, supra note 61, at 20. This is an age-old criticism. In 1941, Harry
Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield noted the problem of settling before the suit reaches the court
and observed, "as a practical matter this type of settlement may seriously impair the
opportunities of the rest of the class to acquire knowledge of the wrong and to assert their
rights effectively." Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of
the Class Suit, 8 U. CHi. L. REV. 684, 720 (1941).
75 FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(e), (g)-(h).
76 See Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1503-04 (noting significant increase in
participation rate of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs since enactment of PSLRA).
Stephen Choi notes that this provision may lead to "rational apathy" because of long-term
relationships with public companies. Choi, supra note 54, at 1475. Moreover, institutional
investors may get involved simply to "push the political agenda of those politicians with
influence over the public pension fund." Id. at 1476; see also Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch &
A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 872 (2005) (finding that
increased involvement by public pension funds has had "no significant effect on attorneys' fee
awards").
7 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 103, 109
Stat. 737, 741-42 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.)
(requiring courts to monitor compliance with Rule 11 and impose sanctions if necessary); see
also Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1493 (noting that PSLRA "ratchet[s] up judicial
supervision of lawyers").
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But these provisions can occasion new problems. For instance,
the lead plaintiff provision may have recreated the collective action
dilemma, thus compromising the class action's purpose. Serving as
a lead plaintiff costs institutions time and money7" and may expose
them to costly discovery revealing their investment strategy. 9
Despite extra effort and added headaches, lead plaintiffs receive
only their pro-rata share of recovered funds.8 ° Other investors
collect the same proportional benefit minus the burden.8 ' This
generates an incentive to free ride on others' efforts and recreates
the quintessential collective action dilemma.8 2 Stephen Choi and
Robert Thompson expand this point by observing, "[iun a world
where investment manager performance is regularly measured by
relative returns, the possibility of competing managers free riding
on your efforts, or the comparative option of your free riding on
other investors, operates as a disincentive to participate as a lead
plaintiff."8" In short, the lesson is that manipulating variables
within class practice without considering perverse and unintended
consequences may inhibit enforcement.
Finally, critics contend that plaintiffs' attorneys fail to pursue
economically unattractive cases--cases involving companies with

78 See Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1505 ("[Olther shareholders of the company

will thus get the same proportional benefit without having to offset any of the recovery
against the expenses which the lead plaintiff has incurred.").
79 Id. at 1504-05.
o The PSLRA explicitly bans incentive payments to lead plaintiffs (prompting the Milberg
Weiss investigation). Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(2)(A)(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2006)
(requiring certificate acknowledging that plaintiff cannot accept more than its pro rata share of
proceeds); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(2)(A)(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi)
(2006) (banning payments to representative plaintiffs on anything other than pro rata share);
see also Timothy L. OBrien & Jonathan D. Glater, Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods?: The
Government Takes Aim at a Class-Action Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at BU1
(describing criminal investigation against Milberg Weiss law firm for allegedly conspiring with
lead plaintiff in dozens of fraud suits against corporations). This is not the case in other types
of class actions. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to ClassAction
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1310-11 (2006) (noting that while
incentive awards for representative plaintiffs were achieving recognition in other contexts,
PSLRA prohibits such incentives).
81 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 80, at 1305-06 (describing financial burden carried
by lead plaintiffs).
2 For further explanation of the collective action dilemma, see Choi, supra note 54,
at 1466, and see infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
' Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1505.
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less market capitalization-and thus leave enforcement gaps.' But
if securities class actions supplement regulation, it should come as
no surprise that cost-benefit analysis-a concept quite familiar to
public regulation-also influences the private sphere.8 5 This
skepticism may belie a deeper belief that every misdeed warrants
enforcement to the letter-a belief negated by prosecutorial
discretion and agency priority setting. Besides, larger settlements
should correlate with greater expertise and meritorious actions.
That is, merit-based claims-claims with significant economic
value-produce higher monetary settlements than those settling for
nuisance value.8 6 Simply put, private actors have enforcement
discretion too, but they weigh factors differently than an
administrative agency might.
Moreover, class actions are easy targets for arbitrary enforcement
allegations. Dispersed actors initiate them for any number of selfish
or altruistic reasons.
The hard point is why concern falls
disproportionately on private enforcement rather than agency
inaction. SEC inaction is political and nonreviewabley but class
actions against corporate defendants are saddled with an implicit
assumption that plaintiffs' attorneys simply sought the deepest
pockets.
These assumptions seep into class certification considerations,
tainting consequence-based regulation. Theoretically, courts cannot
consider a class action's merits in determining whether to certify

" See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 58, at 1564 (arguing that reducing damages decreases
incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys to seek out and prosecute securities fraud).
' Richard A. Nagareda, ClassActions in the AdministrativeState: Kalven and Rosenfield
Revisited,75 U. Cm. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 13, on file with author), available
at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract= 1014659; see Eric A. Posner, ControllingAgencieswith Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1137-38 (2001)
(describing trend in circuit courts toward application of cost-benefit analyses as necessary part
of regulatory process).
' Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1516 ("Firms with greater ability at identifying
and prosecuting more meritorious litigation, all other things being equal, will tend to have
a greater market share of the total settlement amount compared with plaintiff law firms
focusing more on nuisance litigation.").
87 Nagareda, supra note 85, at 13; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, JudicialReview of
Agency Inaction: An ArbitrarinessApproach,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (2004) (describing
Supreme Court's reluctance to review agency inaction).
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it."8 Yet recent federal appellate decisions, notably the Second
Circuit's In re InitialPublic Offering SecuritiesLitigationopinion 9
and the Fifth Circuit's Oscar Private Equity Investments v.
Allegiance Telecom, Inc. opinion,9" have whittled away at Eisen's
sweeping prohibition against considering the merits.9 ' This ban has
evolved antithetically: judges must now resolve factual disputes
relevant to certification prerequisites.9 2 But the case's merits are
inextricably intertwined with certification inquiries; the Supreme
Court recognized as much in permitting a "probe behind the
pleadings." 3
The jurisprudential concern is that judges'
assumptions will influence their certification decisions. Agency
litigation, on the other hand, suffers no such bias. As contrasted
with class litigation, SEC enforcement actions enjoy presumed
legitimacy and, because they aren't class actions, need not overcome
Rule 23's certification criteria.94
In short, agency discretion is free from the cynicism confronting
private enforcement. Yet, my point is not to exonerate private
attorneys' decisional basis; rather, it is to observe that agencies also
use a cost-benefit analysis to determine which actions to pursue.
The class certification battle, as compared with agency ease in

' See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (finding no authority under
Rule 23 allowing courts to consider merits of class action when determining certification).
8 See 471 F.3d 24,41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that judge can make Rule 23 determination
even if certification overlaps with merit issues).
90 See 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (asserting that it is misreading of Eisen to
assume that merits questions may never be addressed at certification stage); see also Recent
Case, Fifth CircuitHolds thatPlaintiffs Must ProveLoss CausationBefore Being Certified as
a Class, 121 HARV. L. REV. 890,896 (2008) (arguing that Oscardecision restricts fraud-on-themarket presumption by allowing courts to examine merits at certification stage).
9' See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 ("We find nothing in either the language or history of
Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."); see also Robert
G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1277-80 (2002) (proposing alternative to Eisen rule which would permit
preliminary inquiry into merits).
92 See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 266-69 (inquiring into merits of
plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market theory at certification and holding that "loss causation must
be established at the class certification stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence").
Certification requirements come from FED. R. CrV. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
Cf Nagareda, supra note 85, at 18-19 (comparing legitimacy of EEOC employment
actions to private employment class actions).
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initiating cases, is a sticking point when contemplating the
complementary regulatory roles of the SEC and private actions.
2. Context Specific Criticism of Securities Class Actions.
Although generalized class action critiques are less vexatious in the
securities context, two objections leveled specifically at securities
class actions cause both pragmatic and deontological concerns. The
pragmatic concern, put forth by several high-profile commissions,
charges that securities class actions deter foreign firms from listing
in the United States.95 The deontological, and thus more troubling,
criticism is the so-called "circularity problem."9 6 That is, the notion
that class actions simply shift wealth from one diversified
shareholder's pocket to another, minus significant transaction
costs.97
Consider first the claim that the securities class action's
availability threatens the attractiveness of the United States'
markets to foreign firms. For example, the report commissioned by
Michael Bloomberg and Charles Schumer asserts, "the prevalence
of meritless securities lawsuits and settlements in the U.S. has
driven up the apparent and actual cost of business-and driven
away potential investors."98 Similarly, the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation reported that transactions, listings, and trading
volume are gravitating toward London and Hong Kong.9 9 Both

9

See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
See Coffee, supranote 58, at 1556-66 (arguing that fundamental problem of securities
class actions is pocket-shifting wealth transfers among shareholders).
97 See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
98 MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, at ii (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/om/pdf/ny report final.pdf. Daniel Gross suggests that the blame for foreign firms
flocking abroad may be a bit more obvious:
New York underwriting fees are so high because investment bankers are
the Prada of American financial-services workers ....
To ensure that
things go smoothly, they hire New York's best (read: most expensive)
lawyers, accountants and flacks. In its report, Oxera noted that there was
a "perception among some of the companies consulted" that such ancillary
costs were highest in the United States.
Daniel Gross, Lessons from Motown, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Aug. 13, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 15081393.
9

99

COMM. ON CAP. MRTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS

REGULATION 31 (2006), availableat httpJ/www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInter
imReportREV2.pdf; see also BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 98, at i (noting that
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countries regulate their markets less intensely.1"' While the shift
is real, the cure does not hinge upon eliminating securities class
actions, particularly when the premise rests on the frivolous
litigation myth. Put simply, empirical studies confirm that
widespread frivolous litigation no longer exists even though the
perception of a "litigation explosion" remains.'0 ' Consequently, to
the extent that this myth negatively influences foreign firms,
education and anchoring-not elimination-are better solutions.
Additionally, foreign countries have increasingly adopted their
own forms of collective litigation.' 2 For instance, French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, Deutsche Telekom AG shareholders, and American
lawyers are campaigning for aggregate litigation in Europe; 10 3
Germany recently adopted the Capital Markets Model Case Act, or
"KapMuG," to facilitate collective litigation on behalf of injured
investors; 10 4 and Canada, Australia, China, and Taiwan, among
others, have all enacted various aggregate litigation procedures for
securities cases.0 5 This movement toward globalizing class actions
American financial services industry is increasingly competing with Dubai, Hong Kong, and
Tokyo).
'0o COMM. ON CAP. MKTs. REG., supra note 99, at 40-41 (explaining that Hong Kong ranks
high in terms of regulatory intensity and that financial services prefer more flexible
regulatory philosophy of Britain's Financial Services Authority over SEC).
10 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
102 See generally Conference on Globalization of Class Actions, Oxford Centre for SocioLegal Studies (Dec. 13-14, 2007), available at http'//www.law.stanford.edu/calendar/details/
1066/#relatedinformation and recordings (examining global spread of class actions and
other forms of group litigation).
1"3 Caroline Byrne & Cary O'Reilly, Sarkozy, U.S. Lawyers Shift Class-Actions to Europe
(Update3),BLOOMBERG.COM, July 24,2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aEM8mtlXq3oo.
104 DIETMAR BAETGE, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF COLLECTIVE
LITIGATION 8-9 (2007), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/
events_media/GermanyNationalReport.pdf (presented at Conference on Globalization of
Class Actions, Dec. 13-14, 2007). The Act's origins stem from the Deutsche Teleckom case,
an investor suit involving Germany's most widely held company with over three million
shareholders. Id.
105 W.A. BOGART, JASMmKA KALAJDZIC & IAN MATTHEWS, CLASS ACTIONS INCANADA: A
NATONAL PROCEDURE IN MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL SOCIETY? 3(2007), availableat http://www.
law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/CanadaNationalReport.pdf
(describing enactment of class action procedures); VINCE MORABITO, GROUP LITIGATION IN
AUSTRALIA-"DESPERATELY SEEKING" EFFECTWVE CLASS ACTION REGIMES 7 (2007), available
at httpJ/www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/Australia-NationalReport.pdf (same); MICHAEL PALMER & CHAO XI, COLLECTiVE AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS
IN CHINA 7 (2007), availableat httpJ/www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/ events_
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suggests that these countries are grappling with similar trade-offs:
to what extent is society willing to fund and trust centralized
government enforcement in lieu of privatization and direct access to
justice?.. 6 Granted, some countries may be reacting to expansionist
tendencies by the United States courts to include-or some may say
to discriminate against-foreign plaintiffs in allocating settlement
proceeds. Yet the class action's increasing appeal makes sense:
why use public funding for enforcement when privatization can
reduce taxpayer expenses?0 7
Even reducing public costs, however, does not avoid the most
that it simply
damning securities class action criticism:
redistributes wealth among diversified shareholders minus
significant transaction costs.'0 8 The argument is that shareholders
and former shareholders sue the corporation for a misstatement or
omission, even though the corporation itself has not purchased or
sold its securities;' 9 upon settlement, "the corporation and thus,
indirectly, its shareholders, bear the costs."" 0 Diversification
exacerbates this problem by making it more likely that, on any given
day, an investor will be in both the plaintiff-class suing a
corporation and in the shareholder group funding a settlement."'
Professor Coffee labels this a "circularity problem" and argues that

media/ChinaNationalReport.pdf (same); KUAN-LING SHEN & ALEX, YUEH-PING YANG,
MULTI-PARTY PROCEEDINGS IN TAIWAN: REPRESENTATIVE AND GROUP ACTIONS 8 (2007),
availableat httpJ/www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/eventsmediatTaiwanNati
onalReport.pdf (same). All of these papers were presented at the Conference on
Globalization of Class Actions, ajoint conference through Stanford University Law School and
the Oxford University Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, held December 13-14, 2007.
106 We will see more of what this trade-off might entail in Part IV.
'o7 See, e.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 32, at 431-32 (using private enforcement of
"blue laws" as example).
'08 See COMM. ON CAP. MKTS REG., supra note 99, at 72 ("Fines and damages imposed on
corporations are borne by innocent shareholders, thus reducing their returns."); A.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 957-58 (1999) ("The transaction costs of
litigation leading to settlements that merely transfer wealth among shareholders are a pure
social waste, unless class actions provide a substantial deterrent effect.").
1'9 See Coffee, supra note 58, at 1556 (describing "secondary market" case).
0 Burch, supra note 12, at 374.
1 Id. at 374-75; see also Coffee, supra note 58, at 1538, 1558 (noting that diversified
shareholders are often on both sides of wealth transfer). For an interesting illustration of this
redistribution principle using Dobby-Harry Potter's house elf-see Richard A. Booth, The
End of the Securities FraudClassAction As We Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2007).
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these transaction costs fall disproportionately on innocent
shareholders-the fraud victims." 2 This is most likely true. And
his solution, targeting the wrongdoers-corporate officers and
directors who commit fraud-rather
than the corporation,"13 may cut
4
down on these costs."
But it is equally true that any regulatory system generates
transaction costs. 115 For example, the American Enterprise
Institute estimates that complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(Sarbanes-Oxley) has cost businesses approximately $1.1 trillion;" 6
RAND Corporation adds that Sarbanes-Oxley increased the costs of
"being public" from roughly $900,000 to $1,954,000.117 Yet, the
United States still has lower entry costs and barriers than most
other countries, which ex post regulation makes possible." 8

"

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 76-77

(Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 304, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=967482 ("[A] system of enterprise liability is at work that
resembles punishing the victim of a burglary because the victim negligently suffered a
burglary. Such punishment may deter, but among those likely deterred are foreign firms
considering cross-listing in the U.S."); see also COmm. ON CAP. MKTS. REG., supra note 99,
at 72 ("Fines and damages imposed on corporations are borne by innocent shareholders, thus
reducing their returns."); Coffee, supra note 58, at 1556 (describing "circularity problem");
Pritchard, supranote 108, at 958 (noting that misstatements by corporate managers are often
motivated by benefits to managers rather than corporations).
113 Coffee, supra note 58, at 1538.
114 See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked,Homeless and
Without Wheels": CorporateFraud,EquitableRemedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus
Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630, 661 (2007) (arguing that shift from
enterprise liability would reduce costs of security fraud enforcement, and proposing increased
use of equitable remedies such as recession and restitution).
115 See Donald Wittman, PriorRegulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between
Input and OutputMonitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 193, 196 (1977) (stating that both expost and
ex ante monitoring involves transaction costs). Economists, for example, have demonstrated
that private enforcement can actually reduce the overall costs of identifying violations and
can enhance efficiency. Glaeser & Shleifer, supranote 32, at 431-32. Transaction costs are,
however, ubiquitous. See KAGAN, supranote 40, at 104-08 (concluding that American legal
costs are high because of redundancy, episodic trials, dueling experts, pretrial discovery, and
lawyer-centered as opposed to judge-centered system).
116 Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Sarbanes-Oxleyis Outsourcing U.S. Leadership,U.S. FED.
NEWS, Apr. 16, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 13551235.
117 Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Sarbanes-Oxley'sEffects on Small
Firms: What Is the Evidence?, in IN THE NAME OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP? THE LOGIC AND
EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REGULATORYTREATMENT FOR SMALL BUSINESS 143,159 (Susan M. Gates
& Kristin J. Leuschner eds., 2007).
...See Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 377 ("What really sets the United States apart is the
fact that its basic regulatory model is ex post rather than ex ante. .. ").
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Litigation costs time and money regardless of who is sued.
Shareholders necessarily bear those expenses.'1 9 Even if plaintiffs'
attorneys target officers and directors, determining, and perhaps
litigating, directors' and officers' insurance coverage generates
secondary costs, costs that might be reduced or reallocated if
insurers were better loss prevention suppliers and defense cost
managers. 2 ° This is the bottom line: both ex ante and ex post
regulation costs shareholders money. The key, however, is not in
eradicating private litigation, which simply shifts regulatory costs
elsewhere, but in using class litigation judiciously, limiting damage
awards appropriately, and weighing these costs against securities
class actions' benefits. 2 ' This Article advances the latter point by
developing previously under-theorized benefits accruing from
securities class actions' ability to provide a public good: regulation.
This good, in turn, creates positive spillovers that cannot be
achieved through alternative enforcement regimes.
III. SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS' POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES

Although it may contradict our intuitions and is undoubtedly
controversial, class actions are Janus-faced: they supply a public
good, too. Economists typically define a "public good" as one that
the government must furnish because private organizations lack
market incentives to do so.'22 Public goods thus suffer from a
119 Burch, supra note 12, at 374.
120 See Coffee, supranote 58, at 1570

(noting difficulties in differentiation of insurance for
corporation, corporate directors and officers); see also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The
Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors'& Officers' Liability Insurer, 95
GEO. L.J. 1795, 1808-17 (2007) (stating that D&O insurers do not provide loss prevention
services or manage litigation defense costs). Because the corporation pays for insurance,
shareholders effectively pay for insurance. Coffee, supra note 58, at 1553; Pritchard, supra
note 108, at 957. A strong argument eists that D&O insurance undermines securities class
action deterrence. See Baker & Griffith, supra, at 1818-21 (arguing D&O insurance
undermines deterrent effect of securities liability). I largely agree with and briefly address
that argument in the latter portion of Part III.A.
121 For more on limiting damage awards in securities fraud class actions, see Burch, supra
note 12, at 385-94.
'
William B. Rubenstein, Why EnableLitigation?: A Positive ExternalitiesTheory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006). For more information, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF

GROUPS 14-16 (2d prtg. 1971) (defining public or "collective" goods).
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collective action problem; there is no incentive to provide a product
or service that benefits everyone equally.'23 Two dilemmas explain
this disincentive: "non-rivalry of consumption"-that consumption
by one does not diminish the good's availability for others-and
"impossibility of exclusion'-that limiting the good's use to paying
consumers is not possible.' 24 The textbook example is a lighthouse.
Although there is a need for the lighthouse, building it benefits
everyone equally (invoking the collective action problem) and, once
built, there is no way to exclude certain ships from enjoying its
benefits. 2 ' A less typical example is deterring wrongdoing through
litigation.'2 6 Like the lighthouse, deterrence benefits everyone, not
just litigants. And there is a collective action problem since
potential plaintiffs with minimal damages may do nothing in hopes
of free riding on the future deterrence benefit of others' actions. 2 '
The securities class action overcomes this problem by permitting
investors to pool their claims and allowing plaintiffs' attorneys to
request court approval for fees based on the entire recovery. 2 8 It
privatizes, or some might say subsidizes, the typical governmental
function of regulating and deterring.'2 9 In this manner, class actions
help produce a public good: regulation, which, in turn, creates
positive externalities such as fostering corporate accountability,
promoting deterrence, enforcing public norms, and circumnavigating

123 Rubenstein, supra note 122, at 711; see also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion
of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2623 (1995) ("Economists define a public good as a
beneficial product that cannot be provided to one consumer without making it available to all
(or at least many others). The textbook example is a lighthouse .... ).
'2
RuSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982); Rubenstein, supra note 122, at 711;
see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation,98 NW. U. L. REV. 545,552-53
(2004) (asserting that defining features of public goods are "nonrivalry of consumption" and
"infeasibility of excluding other consumers"). George and Guthrie label courts impure public
goods because "[tihe individualized use ... is inherently divisible and rival, as one person's
presence [i.e., a complaint] precludes others from using the same part of the good during that
period." Id. at 555-56.
125 Luban, supra note 123, at 2623.
See Burch, supra note 25, at 2523 ("Through fostering accountability, enforcing public
norms, and circumnavigating the possibility that an attorney general could abuse her
discretionary authority, class litigation itself becomes a public good.").
12
Rubenstein, supra note 122, at 711.
'2
Id. at 712.
" See Burch, supranote 25, at 2522-23 (suggesting that shifting enforcement to private
sector generates more innovation than government enforcement produces).
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As Bill Rubenstein
potential SEC and exchange inaction. 13
explains, "[tihe class action mechanism is important not just
because it enables a group of litigants to conquer a collective action
problem and secure relief, but also-perhaps more so-because the
" 13 1
litigation it engenders produces external benefits for society.
Like marketplace transactions, expost regulation through securities
class actions has spillover effects reaching more than just lawsuit
litigants.1 2 These spillovers-externalities---occur when one
person's activity benefits another without payment. 3 3 Externalities
theory relies on economic insights to broaden the traditional twodimensional view of class litigation and counter paradigm
paralysis. 34 In short, externalities theory counters orthodox beliefs
that envision class actions as sterile outlays producing nothing and
extracting rents.
Regulating through securities class actions generates a catalog
of positive externalities (some of which would qualify as public goods
innovation, deterrence, information sharing,
themselves):
accountability, and transparency, to name but a few. 35 Admittedly,
these actions may also create negative spillovers such as the
circularity problem. Or, one might find innovation in this setting
problematic and align with those promoting agency justice and

130 Id.; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE

L. REV. 21, 22 (1996) ("In many instances, there is no need to disentangle the private and
public purposes of a citizen-initiated lawsuit. The citizen furthers the public interest by
pursuing private ends."); David Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, CoordinatingPrivateClass
Action and Public Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 159, 172 (2006) ("[O]nly by enhancing the effectiveness of the class action can private
enforcement effectively serve its dual role in relation to public enforcement: complement and
check.").
131 Rubenstein, supra note 122, at 710.
13 See id. at 723 ("The class action takes the spillover effect-the burden of scarce
resources-and shares that burden among all .... ").
1
See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 10, at 262,268 ("[A] wealth ofeconomic evidence
teaches us that spillovers are good for society.").
THE BUSINESS OF
DISCOVERING THE FUTURE:
134 See JOEL ARTHUR BARKER,
PARADIGMS 68-70 (3d ed. 1989) (defining "paradigm paralysis" as recognition that every
individual possesses core set of beliefs through which individual filters new information and
arguments).
'3 See Rubenstein, supra note 122, at 723-25 (identifying these positive externalities as
benefits of class action litigation generally); see also Luban, supra note 123, at 2623-24
(identifying development of advocacy skills as positive externality).
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urging alternative resolution.13 6 But in my view--one embracing a
consequentialist cost-benefit analysis and tending toward KaldorHicks efficiency' 3 7-- these positive externalities outweigh persistent
doctrinal concerns.
As a simple initial example, consider innovation. Private rights
of action conjoined with claim pooling create self-funded
supplemental regulators who can afford to pioneer legal theories,
hire cutting-edge experts, design sophisticated damage models,
conduct electronic discovery, monitor the market, and engineer
fraud detection techniques.'3 8 Private attorneys are risk takers, not
Moreover, private actors counter agency
bureaucrats.
"ossification"-the agency's tendency to maintain the status quo
since it accumulates administrative doctrine and judicial
precedent.'3 9 Explaining these benefits, Brett Frischmann and
Mark Lemley observe, "[i]ndustries with significant spillovers
generally experience more and faster innovation than industries
with fewer spillovers," perhaps because they evoke opportunities for

136

E.g., KAGAN, supra note 40, at 128 ("No other country comes close to matching the

organizational and political energy of American personal injury lawyers, who aggressively
seek out cases, disseminate litigation technologies, dream up new causes of action, and
fiercely resist litigation-reducing reforms.").
137 See Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 826 n.346
(2008) ("The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion holds that an action is efficient if those who
gain from the action benefit, in the aggregate, more than those who lose from the action, in
the aggregate.").
13 Cf David Rosenberg, The CausalConnection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849, 902,908 (1984) (arguing that class treatment
of mass toxic exposure claims would create economies of scale for plaintiffs, which would
Private actors,
result in enhanced financial and technical litigation capabilities).
unconstrained by administrative hurdles and bureaucracy, can quickly respond to suspicious
market activity.
"3 See Nagareda, supra note 85, at 38 (noting agencies' "disinclination to pursue
ambitious, cutting-edge initiatives ... due to the demands of process and judicial review
accumulated in administrative law doctrine over the years"); see also William S. Jordan, III,
OssificationRevisited: Does Arbitrary and CapriciousReview Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 393, 394 (2000) (explaining ossification hypothesis); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossifcation: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997) (" '[Oissification' refers to the
inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs because of analytic hurdles that agencies must
clear in order to adopt new rules.").
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entrepreneurial exploitation. 14 They further suggest that private
entrepreneurs "are part of a virtuous circle because they are in turn
creating new knowledge4 spillovers that support still more
entrepreneurial activity."' '
A. DETERRENCE

This entrepreneurial exploitation engenders deterrence. The
prospect that litigation deters fraud animates the ex ante
incentive-maximizing total social welfare-of our expost regulatory
system. 1 42 Yet, I opt not to dwell extensively on deterrence for two
reasons. First, its evidence is largely anecdotal and mired in
controversy.' 4 ' Empirical analysis cannot, for example, quantify the
amount of fraudulent conduct deterred by litigation, nor can it
measure litigation's benefits.'" Empirical data can, however,
identify private litigation's costs through fee requests and
nonconfidential settlements, which results in a one-sided analysis.
Second, securities class actions' paramount spillovers-accountability
and transparency-surpass and strengthen deterrence.
The impossibility of precisely measuring potential class
litigation's ex ante incentives on a corporate agent contemplating
wrongdoing may make it a fool's errand, but we can at least think

14

Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 10, at 268-69.

Id. at 269.
142 See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,903 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The availability of the class
action to redress [securities fraud] has been consistently upheld, in large part because of the
substantial role that the deterrent effect of class actions plays in accomplishing the objectives
of the securities laws." (citation omitted)); Johnson, Nelson & Pritchard, supranote 11, at 777
("Insofar as securities fraud class actions provide an efficient enforcement device, stock prices
generally should reflect the effectiveness of those suits in deterring fraud.").
141

" See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The SecretAmbition ofDeterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,416

(1999) ("Empirically, deterrence claims are speculative."); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A.
Brennan, Deterrenceof MedicalErrors: Theory and Evidence for MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX.

L. REV. 1595, 1604 (2002) ("Hard empirical evidence of deterrence is indeed difficult to come
by."); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCI., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATINGTHE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 7 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen &
Daniel Nagin eds., 1978) (noting that data on deterrence are inconclusive); Franklin M.
Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 730-35 (1980)

(observing difficulty in performing econometric analysis of deterrence).
14
See Segal & Whinston, supra note 13, at 14 ("A key problem with the empirical
direction is that the benefits of private litigation are difficult to observe.").
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Studies about why officers and
about deterrence logically."
directors lie often cite chronic conditions such as greed, fear,
46
pressure, opportunity, "ethical plasticity," and pollyannaism.
These conditions suggest that if managers rationally engage in a
cognitive cost-benefit analysis before outwardly exhibiting false
optimism (lying), then knowing that they will personally suffer some
penalty could combat and lessen these tendencies.'4 7 Still, these
same conditions also imply, perhaps with equal force, that
misrepresentations are impulsive, not deliberate. Deterrence is
thus paradigm dependent." 4 Some facets of contemporary cognitive
psychology research challenge this duality's efficacy, suggesting
instead that both impulsive and deliberative behavior fail because
people are irrational. But social learning theorists believe the
opposite; they claim that "human behavior can best be explained by
an interaction of cognitive, behavioral, and environmental
factors."'4 9 These theorists suggest that securities class action
1" One study argues that the increased role of institutional investors in class litigation

increases deterrence. Keith L. Johnson, Deterrenceof CorporateFraudThrough Securities
Litigation: The Role of InstitutionalInvestors, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 165 (1997).
On the use of class actions, Richard Posner noted that "the most important point, on an
economic analysis, is that the violator be confronted with the costs of his violation-this
achieves the allocative purpose of the suit-not that he pay them to his victims." RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 349-50 (1972); see also Kenneth W. Dam, Class
Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 47, 54 (1975) (noting deterrent effect of class actions).
" See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liabilityfor Fraudon Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701 ("Our hypothesis is that
managers of ailing firms commit Fraud on the Market in an attempt to save their jobs .... ");
Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 299 (2004) (suggesting "ethical plasticity" as survival trait for
corporate officers); Pritchard, supra note 108, at 930-31 (identifying "fear, greed, and
pollyannaism" as reasons for misstatements by directors); Christopher J. Skousen &
Charlotte J. Wright, ContemporaneousRisk Factorsand the PredictionofFinancialStatement
Fraud,9 J. FORENSIC ACCT. 37, 39-41 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-938736
(identifying pressure, opportunity, and rationalization as relevant factors).
147 See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L.
REV. 115, 116 (1993) ("Deterrence theory assumes that the psychological linkage between tort
law and safer behavior is that people are cognizant of the likelihood of tort sanctions for
proscribed behavior and choose safer alternatives to avoid those sanctions.").
1 See id. at 128-29 (suggesting that impulsive behavior involves little time to consider
tort consequences, and thus "paradigms" of impulsive and deliberative behavior fall at either
end of behavior continuum).
149 Id.
at 157; see also ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 13 (1977) ("A
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judgments, as a form of civil liability or civil "punishment,"
effectively shape behavior so long as they are accurately and fully
publicly communicated. 150 In other words, judgments that lack
transparency, those kept confidential, do not deter.
Social learning theory thus seems to support practical
observations about behavioral tendencies. We know, for example,
that securities class actions cause CEO turnover.' 5 ' One empirical
study by Greg Niehaus and Greg Roth found that defendant
corporations experience a higher CEO turnover rate when compared
with those suffering significant stock price decreases but no
lawsuit." 2 Using a sample of 612 securities class actions, Niehaus
and Roth found that CEOs who lose their jobs in the midst of
securities class actions do not acquire comparable positions within
three years."' They conclude, "[given that the average age of the

comprehensive theory of behavior must explain how patterns of behavior are acquired and
their expression is continuously regulated by the interplay of self-generated and external
sources of influence."); ROBERT L. HEATH & JENNINGS BRYANT, HUMAN COMMUNICATION
THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTS, CONTEXTS AND CHALLENGES 351 (2d ed. 2000) ("Social
learning theory emphasizes the interaction of cognitive, behavioral, and environmental
factors in determining behavior.").
"s See Shuman, supranote 147, at 158 ("Social learning theory, however, is based on the
premise that people observe that inappropriate (i.e. tortious) behavior is punished, and that
appropriate (i.e. nontortious) behavior produces valued outcomes."); see also BANDURA, supra
note 149, at 121 (arguing that observing exemplary punishment can deter behavior, although
punishment observed to occur infrequently has weak restraining effect). Similarly, in the
criminal context, Joan Heminway argues that "[p]erceptions of leniency, more than the reality
that plea bargains may lead to enhanced criminal justice, limit the retributive and deterrent
force of criminal prosecutions under Rule 10b-5." Joan MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No
Fury Like an Investor Scorned: Retribution,Deterrence,Restoration,and the Criminalization
of Securities Fraudunder Rule 10b-5, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 3, 9 (2007).
" Coffee, supra note 58, at 1554 ("For example, some research has found that securities
class actions tend to result in CEO turnovers in their wake. In one study, the filing of a
securities class action was found to more than double the likelihood of a CEO turnover,
increasing it from 9.8% before the filing to 23.4% afterwards." (footnotes omitted)); Charles
M. Yablon, A DangerousSupplement? Longshot Claims and PrivateSecuritiesLitigation,94
Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 595-96 (2000) (describing correlation between securities class actions and
"top management turnover"). But see Anup Agrawal et al., Management Turnover and
Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. & ECON. 309, 311 (1999)
(finding that fraud alone was not correlated to unusually high management turnover).
112 Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover
in
Firms Subject to SecuritiesClass Actions, 28 FIN. MANAGEMENT 52, 53 (1999) ("[Dlefendant
firms experience a higher CEO turnover rate relative to matched firms that also experienced
large stock price drops. . . . [and] meritorious cases are more likely to result in CEO
turnover.").
1
Id. at 68 (noting that study "yielded no instances of a departing defendant CEO gaining
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departing defendant managers is 54, this evidence suggests that the
management turnover associated with [securities class actions] does
impose personal costs on defendant managers." 5 4 While reducing
the availability of directors' and officers' insurance-or making
insurers more effective monitors-and increasing agent liability-as
Professor Coffee proposes-will likely enhance deterrence,15 5
Niehaus and Roth's evidence demonstrates that even current form
securities class actions cause personal negative consequences.
These personal consequences may also include emotional,
ramifications, so long as the
reputational, financial, and social
15 6
transparent.
is
process
litigation
Given this finding, class action litigation's theoretical behavioral
influence is two-fold. First, amassing similar claims through
Rule 23 mounts a notable litigation threat that figures into any
conscious cost-benefit analysis. 5 v Social learning theory predicts
that this "threat effect" deters risky behaviors taken without due
care and increases candor among corporate managers.'58 Put
a new and comparable position ... within three years after leaving the defendant firm").
l" Id.; see also Agrawal et al., supranote 151, at 311 n.6 (suggesting that job loss due to
fraud implies large personal penalties for managers); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects ofSocial
Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization,79 OR. L. REV. 1, 15 (2000)
(examining how legal sanctions supplement social sanctions in order to encourage compliance
with social norms). This result was linked to two measures of meritorious class actions: "the
extent of insider selling during the class period and the settlement amount." Niehaus & Roth,
supra note 152, at 53.
" See Coffee, supra note 58, at 1555-56 (proposing that insurance companies rescind
policies applicable to insiders for fraud or assert traditional coverage exclusions); see alsoTom
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, PredictingCorporateGovernanceRisk: Evidence from the Directors'
& Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CRi. L. REV. 487, 488-89 (2007) (arguing that
D&O insurance achieves deterrence goals only indirectly, if at all); Baker & Griffith, supra
note 120, at 1799 (arguing that D&O insurance may actually increase shareholder losses).
'56 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 95 (1991) ("Managers also face scrutiny in labor markets. If sacked today,
they may have trouble matching their income elsewhere."); Baker & Griffith, supra
note 155, at 489 n.7 (noting emotional impact of shareholder litigation on officers and
directors); infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
157 Burch, supra note 25, at 2550; see also Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 908 ("[B]y
aggregating mass exposure claims, class actions could enable mass exposure victims to
litigate both in the numbers and with the adversarial strength necessary to achieve the tort
system's ... deterrence objectives .... ").
158 See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 573 (1987) (asserting that threatened liability induces
parties to take due care in risky activities); Rubenstein, supra note 123, at 724 (explaining
how "threat effects" produce positive externalities). See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social
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differently, deterrence enhances public welfare by preventing
unreasonable risks that cost more to incur than to prevent.'5 9
Meritorious class suits also catalyze policy and management
changes, the effects of which benefit the public. 6 ' Second, class
actions curtail the need for future litigation by developing the law,
translating legal jargon into standards of conduct, and thus
clarifying and delineating boundaries for acceptable behavior.' 6 '
Of course, nobody claims that securities class actions perfectly
produce or promote optimal deterrence. Proposals across the board,
including some of my own, contend that class actions may over- or
under-deter'6 2 or may fail to promote an appropriate level of
compliance. 6 ' Reforms recommend optimizing fraud deterrence by
targeting the wrongdoers-i.e.,
corporate officers and
directors-rather than the corporation,' pushing D&O insurers to
monitor corporate behavior and litigation costs,'65 clarifying the

Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,83 VA. L. REV. 349,377-85 (1997) (suggesting that
shaming punishments may be more cost-effective and unequivocal in promoting deterrence).
"' David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrenceand Compensation Functions in Mass Tort
Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1880 (2002); see also Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 365 (2003) ("Social
welfare is maximized by minimizing the sum of the costs of (1) losses produced by accidents;
(2) defendants' efforts to exercise care; (3) plaintiffs' efforts to take precautionary measures;
and (4) the costs of administering the torts (or alternative) system.").
" See Rubenstein, supra note 123, at 724 (analyzing how individual suits induce
defendants to change their behavior).
161 See id. at 723-24 (examining how "decree effects" shape legal precedents). This effect
is developed in Part IV.A.1.
162 Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the ClassAction Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 156-62 (2006)
(examining concerns that class action suits over- and under-deter).
16 See, e.g., Burch, supra note 25, at 2550-53 (discussing suboptimal deterrence of class
action suits); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal
Markets, 78 VA. L. REv. 623, 650-55 (1992) (arguing that inefficient enforcement of securities
laws could lead to reduced output of useful information); cf David L. Markell, The Role of
Deterrence-BasedEnforcement in a "Reinvented" State/FederalRelationship: The Divide
Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (arguing that importance
of appropriate levels of compliance in environmental context is difficult to overstate).
"' E.g., Coffee, supranote 58, at 1536 ("Deterrence works best when it is focused on the
culpable, but there is little evidence that securities class actions today satisfy this standard.").
" Baker & Griffith, supra note 155, at 489; see also Baker & Griffith, supra note 120,
at 1841-42 (discussing corporate managers' reluctance to allow D&O monitoring of ex ante
decisions).
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scienter standard, 6 ' and limiting damages to out-of-pocket losses.'67
Yet each of these proposals relies on a single, pivotal assumption:
168
warts and all, securities class actions can deter wrongdoing.
B. INFORMATION SHARING

In addition to securities class actions' potential deterrent effects,
consider also their potential to reduce enforcement costs through
information sharing.
Contrary to the notion that plaintiffs
piggyback purely on the SEC's efforts, the SEC and the plaintiffs'
bar target companies with different capital.'6 9
But for the
roughly 15% of overlapping cases where both the SEC and plaintiffs'
attorneys file suit, 7 ' both regulators profit from increased
information.' 7 ' Ideally, within this overlap, they would exchange
'66

COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REG., supra note 99, at 81.

See Burch, supranote 12, at 385-86 (discussing practical and theoretical ramifications
of restricting plaintiffs' recovery to out-of-pocket losses).
167

" See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 58, at 1547 ("Mhe securities class action

..

can still

perform admirably as a form of deterrence.").
16 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003) ("T]he SEC targets smaller capitalization issuers than
are targeted by private litigants."); see also MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING
ORGS OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1987-1997: AN
ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 41-42 (1999), available at http://www.coso.org/public

ations/FFR_1987_1997.pdf (finding that SEC generally targets companies with more than
$200 million in market capitalization). Some commentators claim that securities class actions
simply "piggyback" on the government's efforts and intensify, rather than diversify,
enforcement. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty HunterIs Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 220-23 (1983).
Other industries, the insurance industry in particular, may differ. See Eric Helland
& Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from
Insurance ClassActions, 1 J. TORT L. 11-12 (2007), availableat http://www.bepress.com/jtl/
voll/iss3/art2 (suggesting that private lawyers and insurance regulators "piggy-back off of
each other perhaps leading to levels of care that exceed the socially optimal level").

170 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and PrivateEnforcement of the Securities
Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 893, 897 (2005); Cox &
Thomas, supra note 169, at 777; see also Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 1, at 361
(finding 17% overlap between SEC investigations and private enforcement actions). Some
economists posit strategies where the violator faces "double jeopardy," i.e., enforcement from
a regulator discovering the violation and from a victim suffering injury from the violation,
"often work better." Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 33, at 411.
171 See Howard M. Erichson, CoattailClass Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco,
and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAvIs L.

REV. 1, 30 (2000) ("Government documentary discovery, especially, can facilitate the pursuit
of claims by private plaintiffs. Not only does the government action provide plaintiffs with
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information and ideas.' 72 Cooperating could reduce discovery and
processing costs, lessen SEC penalties for defendants, minimize
litigation time, and preserve judicial resources.
Yet the real information-sharing rewards flow from plaintiffs'
attorney to plaintiffs' attorney rather than from plaintiffs' attorney
to the SEC. The former relationship creates symmetry between
plaintiffs and defendants in settlement negotiations and levels the
playing field. For example, in a typical mass tort case, repeat-player
defendants typically know more than plaintiffs do about previous
settlements, expert evidence, and discovery materials." 3
Informational asymmetries disadvantage those claimants in both
174
picking their attorney and accepting settlement agreements.
Unlike one-shot claimants, institutional lead plaintiffs in securities
class actions-repeat players-reduce informational asymmetry.
The PSLRA hoped for as much, as demonstrated by Elliott Weiss
and John Beckerman's influential article proposing that institutions
serve as lead plaintiffs. 175 In fact, one study shows that having a
public pension fund as a lead plaintiff positively correlates with a
higher settlement size. 7 s After winning the initial battle for lead

valuable information, but access to that information greatly reduces plaintiffs' costs."). In
addition to private-public information sharing, the SEC and DOJ also share information.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000) (providing for sharing of evidence between SEC and DOJ).
172 Cf Robert B. Ahdieh, DialecticalRegulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 863-64 (2006)
(examining how jurisdictional overlap between regulatory agencies promotes information
sharing).
...Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 902; see also W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitrationand
the Individuation Critique,49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 72 (2007) ("If a dispute occurs, the repeat
player may seek to generate a favorable precedent or, conversely, to suppress rule changes
that might benefit future adversaries. To that end, a repeat-player defendant might settle
weak cases and litigate only those it expects to win. If it does litigate, the defendant may
make substantial investments in its defense for a number of reasons.... The result is that,
in many cases, repeat players will rationally make litigation investments that no individual
litigant can hope to match." (footnotes omitted)).
"u See Witt, supra note 53, at 278-79. Repeat players, on the whole, retain better
lawyers, hire the best experts, and craft settlement agreements that strengthen their
position. See KAGAN, supra note 40, at 122 ("Sophisticated 'repeat players' in the United
States often can avoid the expense and unpredictability of adversarial legalism .. ").
175 Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE
L.J. 2053, 2106-07 (1995).
176 Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 76, at 891. The authors note, however, that
this
correlation may be attributable to cherry-picking. Id. at 892. Any lead plaintiff participation
assumes that it has overcome the new collective action problem. See supranotes 78-83 and
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plaintiff, in theory, former competitors will then join forces rather
and expertise, and thus bolster the
than opt-out, share information
177
litigation's threat effects.
C. ACCOUNTABILITY

Considering information sharing as a class action spillover
reveals a glimpse of class actions' positive, pragmatic side. Yet,
securities class actions also guard against selective enforcement and
inaction by the SEC, the Department of Justice, and the selfThey hold both
regulatory organizations (the exchanges).
corporations and the entities that regulate them publicly
accountable. 1 78 Roughly defined, "accountability" is one actor's
power to demand explanations or justifications for another's
decisions.179 Jurisdictional overlap between public and private
regulatory institutions thus functions as a stopgap measure
Decentralizing
countering selective agency enforcement.
enforcement enhances corporate and agency accountability by
creating profit objectives (contingency fees) for private attorneys. It
also overcomes lackluster governmental incentives; unlike deficient
government performance, inadequate private attorney performance
180
causes personal financial and reputational repercussions.
Moreover, unlike public actors with governmental immunity,

accompanying text.
177 Anecdotal evidence suggests that institutions serving as lead plaintiffs do develop
effective litigation and fee supervision skills. Choi & Thompson, supranote 70, at 1506; see
also Johnson, supra note 145, at 156 (noting that investors can benefit from increased
participation of institutions in securities litigation). Choi and Thompson report, for example,
"the New York State Comptroller's Office... [has] three year contracts with about fifteen
firms." Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1506.
...For information on accountability as a public good, see Anita L. Allen, Privacy Isn't
Everything: Accountability as a Personaland Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375, 1387 (2003)
("Accountability chills, deters, punishes, prompts, pressures, and exposes.").
179 Edward Rubin, The Myth ofAccountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2073 (2005).
"s See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 39, at 1436 ("[Plrivate corporations may not
survive in the face of poor performance, while government enterprises generally do not face
such a risk.").
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market-based accountability, discipline, and sanctions hold private
attorneys externally accountable. 8
Despite these hurdles for the private sector, the numbers verify
that private class actions exert substantially more leverage than the
exchanges and the SEC. For example, from 2000 to 2002, plaintiffs
initiated an average of only 205 securities class actions versus
some 5,000 actions by the SEC, States, National Association of
Securities Dealers, and the New York Stock Exchange. a2 Yet, these
class action settlements and trials totaled awards of over $1.9
billion, whereas the entire public enforcement effort, not including
arbitrations by the NASD or NYSE, resulted in sanctions of $1.86
billion.8 3
The class action's monetary sanctions comprise
roughly 52% of total monetary sanctions for both public and private
enforcement actions. 84 It is little wonder that these numbers are
manipulated by context; depending on the pundit, they show either
that private actions cost shareholders substantially more than
public enforcement actions or that private actions are more

181 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; see also Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra
note 39, at 1423, 1448 ("Private actors face discipline that public actors do not. Moreover,
there is a danger that public actors, even if potentially more successful at pursuing a
particular end, will pursue socially undesirable ends because of political self-interest.").
182 See infra APPENDIX.
18" See Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
'84 COMM. ON CAP. MKTs. REG., supra note 99, at 71. Cornerstone Research's 2005 data

shows the overwhelming private civil penalties compared with SEC actions for some of the
most recent securities class actions:
CASES WITH ACCOMPANYING SEC SETTLEMENTS
Dollars in Millions
Company
Settlement Fund in
Settlement Fund in
SEC Action
Related Class Action
WorldCom, Inc.
$750.0
$6,156.1
Computer Assoc. Intl, Inc.
$225.0
$128.6
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
$150.0
$300.0
Symbol Technologies
$37.0
$102.0
Lucent Technologies, Inc.
$25.0
$517.2
i2 Technologies, Inc.
$10.0
$87.8
Gemstar-TV Guide Intl, Inc.
$10.0
$92.5
Homestore, Inc.
$5.0
$78.0
Measurement Specialties, Inc.
$1.5
$8.1
LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM Acr
SEcuRITIEs SETTLEMENTS 13 (2005), availableat http'//www.cornerstone.com/pdf/practice_
securities/PostReformActSecuritiesSettle2005.pdf.
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effective.'8 5 Regardless of your own reading, no one can deny private
actions' centrality in enforcement, for better or worse.
Critics contend that securities class actions are unnecessary, that
the SEC and the exchanges, through the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), have adequate means and incentives
to ensure market integrity." 6 Despite the SEC's status as a highly
regarded institution, both limited resources and agency capture
hinder optimal enforcement. Harvey Goldschmid, a former SEC
Commissioner, recognized the private bar's importance in this
regard: "Private enforcement is a necessary supplement to the work
that the S.E.C. does. It is also a safety valve against the potential
87
capture of the agency by industry.""
Consider first how limited resources tax enforcement. While
testifying before the Appropriations Committee, SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox lamented the agency's enormous task in light of its
scant resources:
About 3,600 staff at the SEC are responsible for
overseeing more than 10,000 publicly traded companies,
investment advisers that manage more than $32 trillion
in assets, nearly 1,000 fund complexes, 6,000 brokerdealers with 172,000 branches, and the $44 trillion

155

One study found that "the expected costs required to deter an adversary vary as a

function of the stakes it seeks, and that this relationship between expected costs and stakes
is convex: Deterrence gets 'easier' as the stakes and threatened sanction increase." Gary
Schaub, Jr., Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 389,405 (2004)
(commenting on C. Arthur Williams, Jr., Attitudes Toward Speculative Risks as an Indicator
of Attitudes Toward Pure Risks, 33 J. RISK & INS. 577, 577-86 (1966)); see also Erichson,
supra note 171, at 42 ("Private class actions, more than government litigation, compel
defendants to pay the costs of injuries.").
'" See Pritchard, supra note 108, at 963-66 (arguing that exchanges have several
advantages over class actions as monitoring devices); see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange
as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1459 (1997) ("The necessity of attracting investors who
have ample alternatives should lead exchanges to choose rules and listing standards that
produce benefits to investors until the value investors attach to further benefits is outweighed
by the cost of providing them."). But see Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of
Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation,38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 143 (1995)
(arguing that there is no evidence that self-regulating exchanges are efficient).
"s Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2006, at Al; see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("Private
enforcement ofthe [securities laws] provides a necessary supplement to Commission action.").
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worth of trading conducted each year on America's stock
and options exchanges. These daunting numbers make
it clear that, even if the SEC budget were to double or
triple, the agency would have to carefully set priorities.88
But priorities have a dark side. The very word implies that
wrongdoers under the political radar may avoid penalties.
Corporate officers monitor the SEC's priorities and tailor their own
activities to avoid the SEC spotlight.'8 9 Of course, they also know
that surreptitious behavior at the margins will be ignored.
Although SEC priorities change periodically, the reality is that
without private enforcement as a shotgun in the closet,
nonprioritized wrongful practices may not be sanctioned. 9 ° Thus,
social learning theorists would predict that corporate agents who
observe inappropriate behavior-evading sanctions may be less
reticent about engaging in that behavior themselves.'
Positive political theory further explains the effects of prioritizing
in agency capture terms.'9 2 Legislators design administrative

"s Testimony ConcerningFiscal 2008 AppropriationsRequest: HearingBefore the H.
Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government and the Comm. on
Appropriations, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission) (emphasis added), availableat http:/
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts032707cc.htm. Current priorities include corporate
financial fraud (including backdating stock options), self-regulatory organizations'
compliance failures, and mutual fund related fraud. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2006
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 8 (2006), availableat http://www.sec.gov/abo
ut/secpar/secpar2006.pdf. The SEC prioritizes based on deterrent effects, SEC visibility,
the message sent to investors and the industry, and the harm to investors. Cox & Thomas,
supra note 169, at 759.
is See, e.g., Thomas 0. Gorman & William P. McGrath, Jr., What Every Issuer,Director
and Officer Should Know About CurrentSEC Enforcement Policiesand Trends, 35 SEC. REG.
L.J. 100, 100 (2007) ("For issuers and their directors and officers, an understanding of current
[SEC] enforcement priorities, policies and trends is critical. That knowledge can help
companies, directors, officers, counsel, auditors, and others who provide services to public
companies, take steps (such as reviewing compliance programs) to avoid liability.").
19
The number of new SEC enforcement cases dropped 9% from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal
year 2006, perhaps suggesting that budgetary constraints hinder litigation activity. Carrie
Johnson, SEC Enforcement Cases Decline 9%: Staff Reduced Because of Budget Crunch,
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2006, at D3.
191 See Shuman, supra note 147, at 158.
192 "Agency capture" conveys the idea that a particular agency capitulates to industry rather
than to consumers. See, e.g., Peter Schuck, Commentary: A Cure for What Ails the FDA,
LAW.COM, June 26, 2007, http'//www.law.com/splarticle.jsp?id=900005555918 (observing that
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processes to serve political choices and bend to policy objectives.19 3
Because Congress oversees the SEC and the President appoints its
chairman, its budget and enforcement priorities are necessarily
products of the political process.' 9 4 Preying on its bureaucratic
infrastructure is an easy way to extend political victories.' 95
Moreover, the SEC, perhaps out of necessity, capitulates to special
interest groups. 196 For example, consider the SEC's initial
willingness to exempt small business from Section 404 of SarbanesOxley and the small business lobby's strength.'9 7 Some have even
pinpointed the agency's capture by special interests-with

FDA critics claim it is more accountable to "Big Pharma" than to the public). I should note that
capture is perhaps less problematic in the SEC than in other agencies, but note that it may play
a role in enforcement priorities.
193 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Delegation, Risk Diversification, and the Properly
PoliticalProjectofAdministrativeLaw, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 202, 209 (2006), http://www.har
vardlawreview.orgforum/issues119/febO6/rodriguezpdf("[Administrative processes .... are
almost always political choices, and rational legislators... design these processes with an eye
toward policy outcomes."); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and the
Constraintson Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 470 (1999) (suggesting undue
influence of politics on agency policy). Still, there is some distance between the SEC and
Congress. Congress has little direct influence on the day-to-day operations, giving the SEC
some freedom. See Jonathan R. Macey, Positive PoliticalTheory and Federal Usurpationof
the Regulationof CorporateGovernance: The Coming Preemptionof the MartinAct,80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 951,953 (2005) (noting distance between members of Congress and day-to-day
work of administrative agencies).
"9 See Macey, supranote 193, at 951 ("Ihe SEC, like other administrative agencies, is
a creature of the political system. . . ."); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper,
Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 319 (2005) ("Like Congress, federal agencies are subject to
influence from various individuals and entities that may result in biased decisionmaking.).
Howell Jackson and Mark Roe add that public actors may also "have mixed and often weak
incentives to do their jobs well." Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence 1 (Aug. 28, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http-//ssrn.com/abstract=1000086. As an extreme example of
capture, one need only look to Russian governmental securities law enforcement in the 1990s.
See Hay & Shleifer, supra note 23, at 398-99 (discussing poor quality of Russia's legal system
and its impact on business).
...See Macey, supra note 193, at 972-73 (concluding that changing regulations through
bureaucratic process illustrates importance of utilizing opportunities created by crises).
" See John C. Coates IV, Privatevs. Political Choiceof SecuritiesRegulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INTL L. 531, 541-42 (2001) (noting lobbying effects on SEC
and Congress); cf Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture and Tort Law: The
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 37-39 (2000) (contending that
agency capture claims should be nonjusticiable).
197 Levitt, supra note 1, at 1484 (referring to small business lobby as "one of the fiercest
in Washington").
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congressional acquiescence-as causing the meltdown of several
major corporations. 9 a
Although SEC enforcement suffers from scarce resources and
agency capture, 199 it complements private actions with tools that are
unavailable to private plaintiffs. For instance, the SEC need not
prove damage, injury, or reliance to sue, nor must it meet class
certification criteria. °° Under federal securities laws, it can choose
from an array of sanctions including administrative cease-and-desist
orders and orders barring or suspending individuals from acting as
reporting companies' officers or directors.2"' Further, to the extent
that criminal sanctions deter individuals from committing fraud, 2
the SEC transmits evidence and refers cases both formally and

19

See Jonathan R. Macey, State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L.

REV. 117, 117-18 (2004) (arguing that SEC's failure to pursue certain corporate scandals was
likely caused by agency's capture by special interests).
199 See, e.g., MANUEL F. COHEN & GEORGE J. STIGLER, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES
PROTECT THE CONSUMER? 21-43 (1972) (discussing effectiveness of government regulation as
means of insuring healthy competition and consumer satisfaction); HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 33-34 (1979) (noting
SEC's lack of sufficient knowledge of industry to exercise oversight effectively); David J.
Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535, 538
(1988) (arguing that SEC research is both inefficient and undercompensated); Walter Werner,
The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 769 (1984) (noting inefficient resources
of SEC). Behavioral finance scholars also criticize the SEC for its own bounded rationality.
Stephen Choi andA.C. Pritchard observe that "[tihe SEC's inability to assess all market risks
and prioritize among them (due to the bounded capabilities of the agency staff and
commissioners) may help explain the SEC's difficulties in grappling with problems in the
financial markets." Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, BehavioralEconomies and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1, 24 (2003).
2 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that reliance is not element of 106-S violation and thus SEC need not prove reliance);
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[A] district court may
grant the Commission's request for disgorgement even where no injured investors can be
identified."). See also ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBEERG AND
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 9:1 (2d ed. 2003) (noting
minimum standards required for SEC proceedings as opposed to private actions).
2' See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a) (2000) (cease and desist orders); id. § 78u(d)(2) (judicialorders
barring individuals from serving as officers or directors); id. § 78u-3(a) (cease and desist
orders).
'
As Jennifer Arlen observed, criminal sanctions may have perverse effects if imposed
on corporations. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially PerverseEffects of CorporateCriminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) ("Previous analysis suggests that increased
corporate liability necessarily reduces crime. Introducing corporate enforcement costs,
however, reveals that increased corporate liability does not necessarily reduce corporate
crime and, indeed, may result in increased crime.").

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 104 2008-2009

2008] SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AS REGULATION

105

informally to the Department of Justice.0 3 In short, my claim is not
that the SEC is defunct, but that private class actions foster
corporate accountability by supplementing the SEC's efforts.
On this efficacious relationship, James Cox and Randall Thomas
observe, "the SEC cannot and does not prosecute all violations and
the private suit picks up the slack," thus "even when there is a SEC
enforcement action, the private suit provides a more encompassing
remedy for the injured investors."0 4 Although private class actions
produce larger settlements with a parallel SEC action, the SEC and
private attorneys tend to earmark different sized companies." 5 The
SEC targets companies with a market capitalization of $735 million
less than companies that the plaintiffs' bar pursues.0 6 One
explanation is that smaller corporations have fewer auditing
resources. 0 7 Naturally, the contingent fee also plays a role. Low
capitalization and trading volume may render any damage recovery
too small to justify the cost and time required for mounting an
effective securities class action. 0 ' In sum, these data suggest that
the interrelationship between private and public enforcement is
beneficial: it increases corporate and regulatory accountability, a
positive spillover for the investing public.

2w BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 200, § 9:4; see also Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the U.S. Department of Justice Corporate Fraud
Conference (Sept. 26, 2002), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/speeclspch585.htm (noting
SEC's close relationship with other law enforcement agencies); see generally United States
v. Shindler, 173 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (demonstrating prosecution of securities laws
violation by Department of Justice). For an interesting perspective on structural reform
prosecution by the DOJ, see Brandon L. Garrett, StructuralReform Prosecution,93 VA. L.
REV. 853, 853 (2007) ("In . . . structural reform prosecution, prosecutors secure the
cooperation of an organization in adopting internal reforms.").
2o4 Cox & Thomas, supra note 169, at 779.
20

Id. at 763.

20

Id. at 764; see also BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 169, at 41-42 (noting that certain

regulatory provisions may fail to target even smaller companies).
207 Cox & Thomas, supra note 169, at 766; see also BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 169, at 41
(suggesting that smaller companies lack resources to implement effective internal controls).
2ow See Pritchard, supra note 108, at 951-52 ("[Clompanies with small capitalizations or
trading volume may be effectively immune from the threat of a class action suit.").
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D. TRANSPARENCY

Securities class actions yield yet another advantage: when filed in
public courts with predominately open records, they also create a
transparent process. 9 Transparent judicial process generates three
notable spillovers all positive: (1) it educates the public sector about
legal obligations and remedies and thereby begets two additional
accountability and norm producing measures-marketplace and
social accountability;2 10 (2) it increases judicial legitimacy; (3) it
augments and promotes deterrence by permitting corporate decision
makers and the public to observe sanctions of inappropriate behavior.
First, open proceedings shed light on how laws are enforced and
what they mean.21 ' Through openness, the media can publicize facts
and unearth pertinent information buried in court documents and
the SEC's EDGAR filing system.21 2 Even though securities class
action complaints are notoriously dense, once filed, reporters further
siphon relevant facts into an easily digestible format; they use
"headline-grabbing" messages to communicate frankly with the
public and overcome the inherent "maze-like rules" involved 2in
14
regulatory issues. 21 ' Lawsuits decrease public information costs.

2o A lawsuit's existence is likely to be public, based on both the First Amendment and
common law's approach to the right of access to court records. See Hartford Courant Co. v.
Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing media's and public's qualified right
of access to judicial documents).
210 See Allen, supra note 178, at 1378 ("Social norms of every category-religious, ethical,
moral, legal, and customary-foster accountability."); Burch, supra note 25, at 2547-49
(describing benefits of transparent process); infra notes 215-22 and accompanying text; see
also Resnik, Wither and Whether, supra note 7, at 1102 ("Adjudication's public dimensions
also enable a diverse audience to see the effects of the application of law in many specific
situations.").
211 See Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public
Dimensions of Court-Based ProcessesAre at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 521, 536-37 (2006)
(arguing that open court proceedings permit understanding of law and how it is made).
212 See Luban, supra note 123, at 2625 ("[The discovery and publicizing of facts, which
may subsequently be used by political actors, ordinary citizens, or other agents in the legal
system (litigants as well as lawyers), is a public good created by adjudication."). EDGAR is
the filing system used by the SEC. For more information, visit the SEC's website at httpi/
www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. Stanford's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse also provides
abundant information and is available at http'//securities.stanford.edu/.
21 Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 704 (2007). Many lawsuits also follow on the heels of media
releases or academic commentaries. For example, Erik Lie, a professor of finance at the

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 106 2008-2009

20081 SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AS REGULATION

107

Moreover, access to reliable information subjects companies to
marketplace and social accountability-that is, socially pressuring
corporate actors to conform with community and cultural norms.21 5
These norms are often more stringent than securities laws,
requiring compliance with the spirit of the law, not just the letter.2 16
Securities class actions' transparent nature also exposes CEOs to
discipline and accountability within the managerial labor market,
namely losing their job without the possibility of other prospects.2 17

University of Iowa, and Randall A. Heron, a professor of finance at Indiana University,
recently published a study indicating that more than 2,000 companies used backdated stock
options to enhance executive pay packages. See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does
Backdating Explain the Stock PricePatternAround Executive Stock OptionGrants?,83 J. FIN.
ECON. 272,294 (2007) (concluding that either backdating occurs or that executives can predict
market with reasonable certainty). Professor Lie notified SEC investigators of the reporting
problems as early as 2004. Jonathan Macey, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant
Companionsor OccasionalBedfellows?, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 305,307 (2008). The investigation
and talk of indictments escalated, however, only after the Wall Street Journal and New York
Times began reporting the study's early results. E.g., Charles Forelle & James Bander, The
Perfect Payday-Some CEO's Reap Millions by Landing Stock Options When They Are Most
Valuable; Luck-Or Something Else?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at Al (reporting results of
Lie's 2004 research and resulting SEC investigation); Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe
ImproperBackdating of Options, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2005, at Al (same); Stephanie Saul,
Study Finds Backdatingof Options Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1 (same).
214 Wagner, supra note 213, at 704. This is true for both repeat player institutional
investors and individual investors.
215 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 630-42 (1996) (examining deterrent effect of shaming penalties); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Accountability and InstitutionalDesign: Some Thoughts on the Grammarof Governance, in
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 125-26 (Michael W. Dowdle,
ed., 2006) (examining accountability regimes generated by social networks). One study
investigating reputational effects of financial fraud on outside directors found that "fraud is
followed by a large and significant decline in the number of other board appointments held
by outside directors." Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director
Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth 27 (Oct. 19, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http'//www.olin.wustl.edu/jfi/pdjlfinancial.fraud.pdf. Moreover, [t]his decline is consistent
with both a reputational penalty being borne by outside directors as well as an endogenous
adjustment of monitoring expertise, where the expertise is reallocated to firms that are
revealed to be more fraud-prone than previously expected." Id. at 27-28. Some social
accountability may also come from information gleaned through the grapevine as opposed to
more formal reports.
216 See Cooter, supra note 154, at 15 (explaining that aligning law with social norms
supplements sanctions); Kahan, supra note 158, at 349 (positing that social sanctions are costeffective crime deterrent); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 903, 94.4-47 (1996) (discussing "shame" in function of social norms).
217 See Niehaus & Roth, supra note 152, at 67 ("Thus, the managerial labor market
appears to be the mechanism that is used for disciplining managers of firms subject to
[securities class actions]."). But see Eric Helland, Reputational Penaltiesand the Merits of
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Thus, open proceedings as opposed to private arbitration, for
example, foster social and marketplace accountability.
Second, transparency strengthens institutional legitimacy.2 18
When litigants submit disputes to the court, they reinforce the
court's reputation as an authoritative body.21 On this reflexive
character, David Luban comments, "the more authority adjudication
by courts carries, the more authority it will earn, both because it
casts a longer and more firmly contoured shadow on out-of-court
negotiations, and because its authority inspires more litigants to use
it, further enhancing its authority ..
.,0 Judicial legitimacy's
desirability must surely come down, at least in one respect, to
producing norms and authority. That is, judges elaborate, refine,
and explain public values. Both private and public actors reinforce
these values through litigation, relying again on the judiciary to
sanction breaches and clarify legislative ambiguities.2 2 '
Thus, this translation process provides the foundation for a
normative framework that guides future behavior.22 2
Put
Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & EcON. 365, 366 (2006) (assuming that
reputational penalties to officers and directors subject to securities class actions are proxy for
meritorious lawsuits and concluding that fraud accusations had no negative reputational
effect).
218 See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findingsof
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 664 (2006)
("Transparency and openness foster the belief that decisionmaking procedures are neutral.");
see also Owen M. Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundationsofAdjudication, 6 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 121, 125 (1982) ("In America, the legitimacy of the courts, and the power they exercise
in structural reform or for that matter in any type of constitutional litigation, is founded on
the unique competence of the judiciary to perform their distinctive social function, which
is . . . to give concrete meaning and application to the public values embodied in the
Constitution.").
219 See Luban, supra note 123, at 2625 (contrasting judicial resolution with other means
of dispute resolution and noting that "when disputants turn elsewhere for resolution-private
arbitration, nonjudicial government agencies, or private bargaining-the salience of
adjudication fades and the authority of courts weakens").
22
Id. Similarly, Judith Resnik observes, "through access, the public is educated, the
judges and litigants and lawyers are supervised, and knowledge of legal requirements is
disseminated." Resnik, Wither and Whether, supra note 7, at 1114; see also Judith Resnik,
Due Process:A PublicDimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405,405-27 (1987) (arguing that public's
role in decision making process is important component of due process).
"1 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("The Court's
power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself
in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means
and to declare what it demands.").
222 See Luban, supra note 123, at 2626 ("[Aldjudication, which produces rules and
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differently, litigation produces external societal norms that, in turn,
can resolve matters without legal coercion. Take, for example, the
recent class actions against Enron 2 ' and Worldcom. 2 1 Without
exception, these class actions and the scandals that prompted them
generated controversy, news, and debate .225 But they also reinforced
norms and broadcasted judicial sanctioning of inappropriate
behavior. They educated the public, and public outrage demanded
legislative action. For better or worse, Congress responded with
Sarbanes-Oxley.22 6 Thus, in a roundabout way, these public suits
contributed to structural transformation. 22' Even though litigants
reached a settlement, it required court approval, which was

precedents, is instrumentally useful because these provide a normative framework for future
transactions."); Shuman, supra note 147, at 158 ("Social learning theory, however, is based
on the premise that people observe that inappropriate (i.e. tortious) behavior is punished, and
that appropriate (i.e. nontortious) behavior produces valued outcomes."). I have argued
elsewhere that nonclass settlements, in addition to arbitration and mediation, undermine the
development of this framework. Burch, supranote 25, at 2545-46, 2550. That critique is not
as widely applicable to putative securities fraud class actions since courts have decided that
those cases are particularly ripe for class treatment. E.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766
F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Class actions are a particularly appropriate and desirable
means to resolve claims based on the securities laws . . . ."); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424
F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970) ("[Since the effectiveness of the securities laws may depend in
large measure on the application of the class action device... 'any error, if there is to be one,
should be committed in favor of allowing the class action.' "(quoting Esplin v. Hirschi, 402
F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968))); In re Loewen Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 154, 167 (E.D.
'[The
Pa. 2005) ("Class actions are particularly appropriate in securities cases ....
effectiveness of the securities laws may depend in large measure on the application of the
class action device.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Kahan, 424 F.2d at 169)); Blumenthal v.
Great Am. Mortgage Investors, 74 F.R.D. 508, 515 (N.D. Ga. 1976) ("[Als a general rule
securities fraud actions have been held peculiarly amendable to class treatment. .. ");
Mahoney, supra note 163, at 663 ("Securities fraud cases are considered by many to be
paradigmatic situations for use of the class action device.").
'
In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 228 F.R.D. 541,567 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(approving partial settlement as being fair, reasonable, and adequate).
224 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319,360 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (considering
and approving settlements in WorldCom litigation).
m E.g., Ex-Enron Executive Sentenced to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C8
(detailing former Enron executive Kenneth D. Rice's plea and sentencing).
m2 See Macey, supra note 193, at 957-58 (discussing proposal and enactment ofSarbanesOxley).
m2 Burch, supra note 25, at 2550. Owen Fiss argues that transformation through litigation
identifies a set of values that "stand as the core of a public morality and serve as the substantive
foundations of structural litigation." Fiss, supranote 218, at 124. He continues, asserting that
"W[the social function of contemporary litigation is not to resolve disputes, but rather to give
concrete meaning to that morality within the context of the bureaucratic state." Id.
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published in a written opinion.2 2 Rule 23(e) fairness hearings,
conducted in public courthouses, fostered public access.2 29 The
average passerby could wander in; the nation could watch on
television or read about it in newspapers. In short, open process
generated opportunities for public insight into how judges apply
substantive laws and judicial procedures.3 °
What if, in lieu of public adjudication, disputes about Enron and
WorldCom were privately arbitrated? Wouldn't suits with such
vastly public dimensions seem inherently suspicious, even
Kafkaesque, if they took place behind closed doors? What are they
doing in there? How did "they"-whoever they are-come up with
that decision?23' As Immanuel Kant once observed, "[a]ll actions
relating to the rights of other human beings are wrong if their
maxim is not compatible with their being made public."23 2 This is
not to say that all private resolutions are suspect by nature. Rather,
public law controversies, such as securities fraud cases, should be
open for public scrutiny.2 33 As Justice Brandeis famously observed,
m E.g., In re WorldCom, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 333 ("[Class notice] set a deadline of
August 12, 2005 for any objections to the settlements and announced a September 9, 2005
fairness hearing.. .. "); In re Enron, 228 F.R.D. at 544 ("A fairness hearing on the proposed
settlement was held on August 19, 2004.").
2
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring fairness hearing before proposed class action
settlement can be approved). For more information on fairness hearings, see generally
William B. Rubenstein, The FairnessHearing: Adversarialand Regulatory Approaches, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1435 (2006).
"'
See Resnik, Whither and Whether, supra note 7, at 1103 ("The literal and material
presence of adjudication stems in part from its performative qualities: much of the activity
occurs in buildings open to the public."); Jean R. Sternlight, CreepingMandatoryArbitration:
Is It Just?,57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1662 (2005) ("[Olur public court hearings educate the public
and potential wrongdoers as to how the law is being interpreted, thereby deterring potential
wrongdoers from violating the law, educating victims as to their rights, and inviting the
public to take action to help reform the law should it not be satisfied with the public results.").
2"1 One might level similar criticism at the jury deliberation process. That process,
however, is subject to judicial checks through motions for new trial and motions for renewed
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
232 IMMANUEL KANT, POLriTCAL WRITiNGS 126 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
's See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Headingwith MandatoryArbitrationof Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 295 (1999) ("When public laws are enforced
in the private fora, however, we have no assurance that the underlyingpublic interestsare fully
satisfied."); see also Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671 (1986) (suggesting that distinction between public and
private law cases is not easily identifiable); Wagner, supra note 213, at 709 ("Litigation also may
not serve the general public interest if the proceedings of a case are concealed. For example, if
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"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman."2 34 Securities class actions affect the
economy, the public, and investors worldwide; public access in these
actions matters. Open hearings enable the public to observe state
and federal actors generating social norms and enforcing ethical
constraints on corporations that frequently appear untouchable.
Class litigation thus levels and alters the typical dynamic's
respective power: individual versus the corporation.

IV. RECONCEIVING CLASS ADJUDICATION
But the securities class action and its leveling function are under
attack. In her provocatively titled article, Opting Out of Liability:
The Forthcoming,Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action,
Myriam Gilles predicts the death of Rule 10b-5 class actions:
So if I am right-if we are entering a world where the
requisite "agreement" to arbitrate is satisfied by noticeplus-acceptance of the product-then the door may be
open just wide enough to impose collective action
waivers in the classic 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market
context, provided that there is sufficiently clear
notice. . . I can imagine, for example, a NASDAQ
website listing companies who have elected to "opt out"
of class action exposure.2 35

the litigants agree to seal damaging documents as a condition to settlement, then the courts can
do little to dislodge this stubborn, privately held information."). Although openness is important
in national matters, such as securities fraud class actions, arbitration can function well in other
areas of securities litigation. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued, nonpublic settlements may
serve some alternative interests such as "consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect,
empathy and emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, access, and yes,
even justice." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland
DemocraticDefense ofSettlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663,2669-70 (1995). Although
a full explanation of precisely which disputes are public and which are private exceeds this
Article's scope, most commentators would agree that securities fraud on the secondary open
market is a public matter.
234 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62

(Sherman F. Mittell ed., Nat'l Home Library Found. 1933).
23
Gilles, supra note 5, at 424; see also KAGAN, supra note 40, at 123 ("Sophisticated
'repeat players' in the United States often can avoid the expense and unpredictability of
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We are not there yet, but we have reached a crossroads; even the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation recommends that the
SEC allow public companies to "opt out" of traditional securities
litigation against an issuer and into arbitration by contracting with
their investors.3 6 And Gilles is right: without a countervailing
interest in public image and accountability, without some legislative
or judicial stops, collective waivers "[mlay [come to [riule the
[e]arth."3 7 This section envisions what a world with governmentcentric enforcement might look like. The thought experiment that
follows exposes the fundamental nature of process-made possible
through public class litigation-that we take for granted.
A. DIS-IMPLYING
LOOKING-GLASS

238

A PRIVATE

RIGHT

OF ACTION-THROUGH

THE

Imagine that the SEC has abolished the private right of action
under Rule 10b-5. What would enforcement entail? The simple
answer is that private securities class actions would no longer
complement the work of the exchanges or the SEC. Arbitration
would assume a central and expanded role in exchange
enforcement.23 9 Of course, the SEC could pursue fraud and insider
trading. But imagine further that limited resources still hinder the
SEC. Its regulatory role would evolve into one primarily of
oversight and delegation, requiring it to outsource most enforcement
adversarial legalism by purchasing more efficient 'alternative' dispute resolution by private
third parties.").
m' COMM. ON CAP. MKTs. REG., supra note 99, at 111 (recommending that SEC permit
shareholders to adopt alternative procedures for dispute resolution, including arbitration).
23 Gilles, supranote 5, at 425.
2 This refers to Lewis Carroll's children's book, Throughthe Looking-Glassand WhatAlice
Found There (1871). The full text is available at httpJ/www.s.indiana.edu/metastuff/looking/
lookingdir.html. Here, I use the looking-glass as a two-fold metaphor: (1) to represent what the
future might look like and (2) to demonstrate that removing the securities class action, when
held up to the looking-glass, is not the remedy that some would like it to be.
m Such a system is not so far-fetched. In fact, several commentators have called for all
securities disputes to be submitted to arbitrators. See, e.g., Steven A- Ramirez, Arbitration
and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious As Well As the
Frivolous,40 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1055,1063 (1999) (suggesting that arbitration could permit
proper functioning of private enforcement). For a brief history of arbitration's use in the
securities industry, see Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: BringingLaw
and Order to SecuritiesArbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 127-33 (2005).
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actions to the exchanges, rely on administrative proceedings, and
pursue only a limited federal court caseload. Granted, the thorny
"circularity problem" about wealth transfers among diversified
investors minus transaction costs would be tidied up with the class
action's demise."' And according to recent commission reports,
national and foreign investors alike may again flock to American
markets.24 '
To be sure, this is an oversimplified picture and, in some ways,
a strawman.24 2 Yet the point of this thought experiment is not to
propose an alternative enforcement regime, such as expanding the
SEC's bounty model,24 3 but to suggest that securities class actions
are a cornerstone in our system of democratic enforcement. This
section envisions the absence of securities class actions and
hypothesizes that, under the current system, the SEC would have
to rely heavily on administrative proceedings and exchange-based
arbitration to fill the enforcement deficit.
Notice that traditional securities law literature speaks of private
rights of action as if they reduce market freedoms in a negative
manner. 24 But our very conception of this freedom includes the
fruits ofexpost regulation through private litigation.2 45 When we go
through the looking-glass, we discover what is wrong: class action
litigation emerges as a lynchpin preventing regulation from

2

See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.

21

The reports contain a variety of recommendations, only a few of which relate to

securities class actions. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REG., supra note 99, at 11-13
(discussing reasons why businesses consider U.S. class action enforcement system so tough
and recommending ways to improve private enforcement).
242 Joseph A. Grundfest has written a widely influential article explaining that "[the
implied Rule 10b-5 private right, although well established under current law, is not
immutable, and congressional action is not required to change its contours." Joseph A.
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission'sAuthority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 965 (1994).
' The SEC currently awards bounties for information on insider trading. See U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM'N, INSIDERTRADING: INFORMATION ON BOUNTIES, http./www.sec.gov/divisions/

enforce/insider.htm (last modified Jan. 6, 2006) (noting that securities laws permit bounty
awards for information on insider trading).
244 See J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair to
Investors?, 24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 389, 399-400 (1989) (noting court delay and litigation
expense as reasons for examining alternatives for dispute resolution).
m See Burch, supra note 25, at 2519 (discussing positive externalities of class action
litigation).
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devolving further into bureaucracy and secrecy.2 46 As compared
with arbitration and administrative opinions' relative obscurity, the
publicity that class litigation generates filters vital information.2 4 v
Moreover, public adjudication creates behavior-guiding precedent,
which bolsters deterrence theory.248
And it fulfills litigants'
preference for process.2 49 Just imagine. As you do, you may notice
that as these sticking points develop, class litigation concerns
lessen.
1. Litigation as an Intermediate Good-Norm Production and
BehavioralConformity. Public litigation has two primary functions:
(1) resolving disputes; and (2) defining, shaping, and clarifying the
law to make behavioral modification and compliance possible.2 5 ° In
this sense, judicial services are not "final goods" but "intermediate"
goods supplying behavioral standards. 251 As an outgrowth of the
first function-dispute resolution-courts interpret and apply rules
and laws.2 52 Particularly, when reduced to written opinions, these

2 Granted, class litigation, conducted initially through plaintiffs' consortiums and
concluded through settlement fund administrators, comprises its own bureaucratic
microcosm. See id. at 2545-46 (describing "new kind of system" created by class litigation).
But trading individual autonomy here is less troubling; without class litigation, it is
economically inefficient to vindicate substantive rights. Moreover, class actions preserve
intra-class transparency and participation opportunities for claimants during significant
decisions such as whether to opt-out, to object to settlement terms, and to object to attorneys'
fees.
2A7 See Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the
Rules Governing
PublicAccess to Information Generated ThroughLitigation,81 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 375,381-82
(2006) (suggesting that public access to judicial information advances several social goals,
including enabling public to monitor judicial behavior, educating public, and informing
citizens of opportunities for participation in system).
m Burch, supranote 25, at 2519 ('[Class litigation] establishes rules of conduct that both
delineate boundaries for acceptable social behavior and decrease the need for future
lawsuits."); see also Goldstein, supra note 247, at 383 (noting that broad public access to
judicial information forms and shapes societal norms).
74 Cf David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, CanLaw and EconomicsBe Both Practical
and Principled?,53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 379 (2002) (arguing that individuals have "positive
tastes" for legal procedures).
' See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy
Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1296-1304 (1995) (discussing litigation's function).
"1 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, AdjudicationAs a PrivateGood, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 236 (1979).
252 Id.
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byproducts, these translations, map the outcome of future suits,
sometimes permitting us to avoid suit altogether.2 53
William Landes and Richard Posner describe rule formation's
social function as "a means of particularizing the standards of
socially desired behavior in order to promote compliance [with
rules].'254 Put simply, judicial precedent gives corporate managers
a behavioral guide and hopes that, if followed, many litigants will
avoid the process entirely. Arbitration does no such thing.25 5
Rather, it is biased against creating binding precedent or rules of
any sort. A party who knew it would lose because of an arbitrator's
previous decisions would refuse to use that arbitrator.2 " 6
Posner and Landes thus liken adjudication to a public good. They
reason that arbitration might perform the dispute resolution
function well enough, but to explain the result in behavior guiding
ways "would be to confer an external, an uncompensated, benefit not
only on future parties but also on competing judges."25 7 To this idea,
David Luban adds, "[allthough the original litigants of the cases

m Id. at 236. Larry Solum contends, "[flor adjudicative procedure to perform its actionguiding function well, procedures and their outcomes must be regarded as legitimate sources
of authority for officials, third parties, and litigants.... If the system is seen as illegitimate
or without authority, then the system may fail." Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189 (2004).
2' Landes & Posner, supra note 251, at 236; see also Luban, supra note 123, at 2622-23
("Rules and precedents, in turn, have obvious importance for guiding future behavior and
imposing order and certainty on a transactional world that would otherwise be in flux and
chaoes.").
m Some commentators argue that even traditional judicial process does not create a
behavioral guide because so many cases settle. See, e.g., RALPH C. FERRARA & DANNY ERTEL,
BEYOND ARBITRATION: DESIGNING ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITIES LITIGATION § 2.25 (1991)
(noting that frequent objection to use of arbitration interferes with common law process of
refining and specifying law). This argument, however, ignores the potential for judges to
clarify the law through motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions for class
certification, and motions for summary judgment. Moreover, any certified class settlement
is subject to a judicial fairness hearing evaluating the settlement's adequacy. FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(e).
' See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1043, 1111-12 (describing impact of perceived bias on arbiter selection); see also Landes
& Posner, supranote 251, at 239-40 ("Any rule that clearly indicates how a judge is likely to
decide a case will assure that no disputes subject to the rule are submitted to that judge since
one party will know that it will lose.").
" Landes & Posner, supra note 251, at 238; see also McAdams, supra note 256, at 1114
("[A] private market will supply an optimal amount of dispute resolution, but not an optimal
amount of dispute avoidance.").
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'purchase' the rules, future litigants use these rules without paying,"
which thus creates a free rider problem."' Precedent created
through adjudication, like other public goods, thus requires
governmental and litigant subsidies." 9 Litigants, understandably,
have little desire to subsidize precedent when they do not foresee
themselves becoming involved in similar future litigation."' This
problem is ubiquitous in public goods. 2 61 But recall that both
defendant corporations and institutional lead plaintiffs are often
repeat players. Thus, unlike most litigants, these players have
some incentive to invest in precedent and adjudicative clarification
and less motivation to opt-out of public adjudication.2 6 2
NYSE arbitral decisions confirm the theory that arbitration
stymies precedent production.6 3 Although the exchanges make the
win-loss decision public, the decision is simply a cursory summary.
Decisions have no precedential value. They contain little more than
the litigants' names, filing date, hearing dates, decision dates, a one
sentence case summary, a two to three sentence decision, and the
award amount.2 6 There is no way to standardize legal principles

228

Luban, supra note 123, at 2623.

"29 See McAdams, supra note 256, at 1114-16 (observing that government-paid fixed
salaries "avoids motivating selfish adjudicators to maximize future disputes").
260 Id.
21 Id. ("[Diisputants will invest only to the point where the marginal private costs equal
their marginal private benefits.").
262 See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
263 See KAREN KUPERSMITH, PLI, A GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AT THE NEW YORK STOCK

EXCHANGE 16 (2006), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/arb-usersguide.pdf(last updated Jan. 2006)
("Generally, arbitration awards simply state whether a party succeeded in proving its claim
and, if so, the amount of any monetary award or other relief, or whether the claim was
dismissed; there is usually no explanation as to how the arbitrators reached their decision.").
Granted, for corporate repeat players, arbitration provides protection from offensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flightfrom
Arbitration:An Empirical Study of Ex Ante ArbitrationClauses in the Contractsof Publicly
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 335,342-43 (2007); see alsoKenneth S. Abraham & J.W.
Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 364 (2003) ("[IUn
ordinary litigation the doctrines ofcollateral estoppel and stare decisis would give the insurer
only one bite of the apple.").
' See, e.g., Kownacki v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 2003-014635 NYSE (2007) (Sloate,
Lindbergh, Doherty, Arb.), available at http'/www.nyse.com/arbitration/1184063076090.html
(determining settlement agreement); Lehman Bros., Inc., 2006-016560 NYSE (2007) (Daniels,
Jennings, Corse, Arb.), available at httpJ/www.nyse.com/arbitration/1180694593406.html
(same).
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from case to case.2" 5 This makes impossible any hope of treating
similarly situated people or corporations similarly. 26 6 Arbitration
thus creates an overriding concern that is more problematic than
the neglected behavior-guiding function. It creates a problem with
transparency.
Expanding arbitration and eliminating class actions' part in ex
post regulation prompts two deterrence-based critiques. First,
arbitration's opaque, private nature keeps decisions in the shadows;
decisions are subject to neither public scrutiny nor traditional
appellate review.2 67 In fact, arbitration advertises confidentiality
and privacy as hallmark features.268
Confidentiality shields
pleadings, testimony, and documents from the investing public.26 9
Granted, this is less problematic in disputes that involve the public
indirectly, such as broker-customer quarrels, but when the public
cannot observe the administration of justice on a matter directly
affecting investors and stock prices, such as securities fraud, the
public might rightly conclude that there is something to hide,
something like agency inaction, industry bias, or self-interest.

' Moreover, the NYSE rules explicitly refuse to entertain class actions. NYSE, Inc.,
Arbitration Rules, Rule 600(d), availableat http://wallstreet.cch.com/NYSE/Search (search
for "600(d)"; then follow "Rule 600.Arbitration" hyperlink) (prohibiting class arbitration); id.
at 627(f), availableat http://wallstreat.cch.com/NYSE/Search (search for "627(f)"; then follow
"Rule 627.Awards" hyperlink) ('The awards shall be made publicly available, provided
however, that the name of the customer party to the arbitration will not be publicly available
if he or she so requests in writing.").
See Sternlight, supranote 230, at 1662 ('The fundamental premises of the 'rule of law'
are that similarly situated persons should be treated similarly under the law and that persons
of privilege or influence should not receive special treatment.").
27 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ARBITRATION, CHALLENGING A DECISION, SEC
ROLE,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/arbappeal.htm (last modified June 25, 2006) (stating that
arbitration decisions are not subject to appeal).
m E.g., KUPERSMITH, supra note 263, at 1 ("[Ihe hearings all share one common
element-they are generally not open to anyone who is not a named party, a corporate
representative of a named party, or an attorney of a party. Since privacy and confidentiality
are two of the hallmarks of arbitration, those not directly involved may only observe the
proceedings with the consent and permission of all the parties and arbitrators.").
20 Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 30 A.B.A. J. SEC. LrIG. 2, 4 (2004), available
at http'//www.abanet.org/litigation/journal/opening-statements/04winter--openingstatement.

pdf.
270 See supra notes 209-33 and accompanying text. Perceptions of bias are prevalent in
securities arbitration. See, e.g., Sung J. Lim, Mandatory Arbitration in the Securities
Industry: Efficiency at the Cost ofJusticeforAll?, 26 J. CORP. L. 771, 801 (2001) (arguing that
swift justice through arbitration "is not always fair"); Cheryl Nichols, ArbitratorSelection at
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Second, arbitration opinions fail to articulate decisions in ways
that instruct behavior. This creates future disputes that litigants
could have avoided. While this benefits arbitrators by generating
more business, it burdens officers and directors with additional
Conversely, because class action litigation elicits
disputes.
opportunities for judges to construe and explain securities laws,
standards, rules, and procedures, it enables corporate actors to
adhere to public values.27 ' Arbitration thus erodes opportunities to
give force to and interpret these values.272 Moreover, in class action
litigation, even when it ends in a certified settlement subject to an
open fairness hearing, litigants can see conflict patterns and
sanction or settlement variations.273 This knowledge shapes
underlying norms and opens a forum for debating appropriate
penalties.274 For instance, debates over penalties, procedures, and
fora led Congress to enact the PSLRA, SLUSA, and SarbanesOxley.275 Regardless of whether these Acts were positive or negative

the NASD: Investor Perception of a Pro-SecuritiesIndustry Bias, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 63, 127 (1999) ("There is likely to remain an appearance of impropriety in the
arbitrator selection process because of ambiguity, under-inclusiveness, and over-inclusiveness
in the arbitrator classification system combined with too much securities industry discretion
in the appointment process of a securities industry sponsored and administered arbitral
forum."); Marc I. Steinberg, SecuritiesArbitration: Better for Investors than the Courts?, 62
BROOK L. REv. 1503, 1531 (1996) (arguing that most investors would likely prefer jury trial
to arbitration); see also Steven B. Caruso, Ethical Standardsfor SecuritiesArbitrators: A
StatisticalPerspectiveofPotentialPartiality(Bias),in SEcURITIES ARBITRATION 2006: TAKING
RESPONSIBILITY, at 147, 154 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8671, 2006)
(citing testimony by Linda D. Feinberg and Karen Kupersmith noting that arbitration awards
statistically favor investors).
271 See Luban, supra note 123, at 2622-23 ("Rules and precedents, in turn, have obvious
importance for guiding future behavior and imposing order and certainty on a transactional
world that would otherwise be in flux and chaos."); Shuman, supra note 147, at 123
(contending that need for certainty in deterrence theory requires that tort law have clear,
understandable behavioral standard).
272 See McAdams, supra note 256, at 1112-14 (arguing that arbitration and other forms
of private adjudication do not supply optimal amount of dispute avoidance); see also Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) ("Civil litigation is an institutional
arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.").
23 Resnik, supra note 211, at 536.
"' See id. ("By knowing and seeing many claims of right, the judgments made, and the
forms of sanctions imposed, a range of individuals and of groups can debate what sanctions
are appropriate and, more basically, what the underlying norms ought to be.").
7 For various theories about the relationship between litigation, law, and norms see
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The StructuralApproach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694-95 (1996) (suggesting
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developments, the public dialog leading to their enactment
furthered fundamental democratic notions.
Arbitration stops this norm-producing function. Using deterrence
and social learning theory, we can also hypothesize that arbitration
results in suboptimal deterrence since officers and directors will be
less certain about which behaviors might result in a penalty.276
Overall then, a world without securities class litigation would be one
with less guiding precedent, less transparency, less public
conversation, more uncertainty and fraud, and with cases that
correspond to one another only coincidentally.277
Moreover, arbitrations make marketplace justice impossible. The
public has little insight into corporate misdeeds affecting the
American economy and thus can express neither outrage over an
"unfair" decision for a market favorite nor boycott products or
services produced by corporate miscreants.278 But achieving this
accountability is impossible when the information needed for

that internalization of norms influences obedience to laws); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2025-29 (1996) (suggesting that human
behavior is function of expressive considerations and that laws influence norms).
216 See Burch, supra note 12, at 380-83 (arguing that "until would-be violators can
approximate the cost of a penalty, they will be unable to adjust their behavior accordingly");
Cooter, supra note 154, at 21 ("Law and social norms have complementary strengths as
means of social control .... The promulgation of a law often transforms a vague principle with
an imprecise sanction into an explicit obligation with a definite sanction."); Shuman, supra
note 147, at 158 ("Social learning theory, however, is based on the premise that people
observe that inappropriate (i.e. tortious) behavior is punished, and that appropriate (i.e.
nontortious) behavior produces valued outcomes."). But see FERRARA & ERTEL, supra
note 255, at 53 (challenging argument that private resolution of securities disputes will
undermine disclosure and deterrence goals of securities laws).
'7
See Luban, supra note 123, at 2641 (hypothesizing existence of world without
adjudication); Sternlight, supra note 230, at 1664 ("Clearly, when disputes are resolved in
private settings, such as binding arbitration, typically neither public access nor public
precedent are assured." (footnote omitted)).
28 See generally MICHAELD. BAYLES, PROCEDURALJUSTICE: ALLOCATINGTO INDIVIDUALS 42
(1990) ("Public rules and principles allow people to plan their activities to conform to them, and
this reason applies whether the rules impose burdens or confer benefits."). Bayles recounts a
story of a female shoplifter who received a harsher sentence than usual. After the newspaper
ran the story, public outrage prevented a continued crack down on other shoplifters. Id.
at 42-43. These "social effects" include reputational losses, business losses, and emotions such
as shame and guilt. Many academics consider these substantial nonlegal sanctions. See, e.g.,
Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctionsfrom Damages?, 30 J.
LEGAL STuD. 401, 405-10 (2001) (discussing consequences of nonlegal sanctions); see also
Mashaw, supranote 215, at 122 (comparing market accountability to public law accountability).
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consumers to self-select is kept private. Judith Resnik observes on
this point, "[tihe public as an audience has an important role in
witnessing, in interpreting, in owning, and in disowning what has
occurred."2 79 This is particularly true in public disputes such as
securities fraud cases. 8 0
2. Bureaucracyand Privatization.Increased arbitrations will not
be the only hallmark feature of a system that shelves private class
actions; the SEC will have to rely extensively on administrative law
judges."' Recall that there are only 3,600 SEC staff to oversee
some 10,000 publicly traded companies, investment advisers
managing approximately $32 trillion in assets, 1,000 fund
complexes, 6,000 broker-dealers, and $44 trillion worth of trading per
year. 2
Without private litigation complementing SEC efforts,
increased bureaucratization is inevitable. Even now, with private
class litigation, the SEC initiated only 218 civil proceedings as
compared to 356 administrative law proceedings.2
But what is undesirable about expanding bureaucracy through
administrative
agencies if it
sustains-and
even
advances-enforcement of securities laws? True, bureaucratization
is a pragmatic solution,' and it has existed since the class action's
inception.2 5 On the positive side, administrative agencies dealing
daily with securities cases develop specialized knowledge and
consistently interpret statutes.2 8 6 Moreover, administrative bodies

279 Resnik, supra note 211, at 537.
'
Although it is difficult to coin an encompassing definition of "public" dispute, it is

equally difficult to identify one more public than litigation involving our securities market.
See Edwards, supra note 233, at 671 ("T]here are a number of public law cases that are easily
identifiable as such. These include constitutional issues, issues surrounding existing
government regulation, and issues of great public concern."); see also supra Part II.A.
21 The Administrative Procedure Act enabled the SEC to use administrative law judges
to resolve disputes. Pub. L. No. 79-404,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559,701-706(2006)). For background on arguments against administrative agencies,
see generally James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process,27
STAN. L. REv. 1041 (1975).
Testimony ConcerningFiscal 2008 AppropriationsRequest, supranote 188.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, supra note 188, at 8.
See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 437 (1982) (discussing
possible use of administrative agencies to implement judges' orders).
'
E.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 74, at 693-94 (contemplating use of special

masters in class suits).
's

See Rodriguez, supra note 193, at 203 ("Agencies... are likely to be more ideologically
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oversee the network of securities laws and can thus uniformly apply
law to divergent facts. 2 ' But at some point, administrative agencies
become wedded to their own precedent-cherishing outmoded
interpretations and eschewing creative approaches.'
Thus,
specialization can become myopic and self-serving, eliminating the
laboratory value of polycentric litigation.2 89
Further, bureaucratization responds to a perception that litigants
are less satisfied with process causing cost and delay. And while
extreme cost and delay is troubling, there is no correlation between
public perception of procedural justice and litigant cost or case
duration. 2 '
Rather, litigants value participation opportunities,
neutral arbiters, and the formality and ritual of court process.29 '
Dignified procedures associated with judicial proceedings cloak them
in legitimacy, enhance authority, and suggest to litigants that the

consistent across a range of issues, and this consistency will be reflected in their
interpretations of regulatory statutes."); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of
DelegatedPower: Uncertainty,Risk, and the ChoiceBetween Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1035, 1047 (2006) ("[Aldministrative agencies are more likely... to treat different
interpretive questions in an ideologically consistent manner within a given time period.").
The classic text on administrative expertise is JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938).
17 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 74, at 719.
' But see Coates, supra note 196, at 543 (arguing SEC has not "suffered from
bureaucratic inertia").
22' See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 672-78 (1981) (arguing that polycentric norm
articulation generates innovation); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of
JurisdictionalRedundancy, 83 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 37-41, on
file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1133602 (discussing innovation as
advantage of multiple centers of authority).
29 E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE 77 (1989); E. Allan Lind et al., In
the Eye ofthe Beholder: Tort Litigants'Evaluationsof Their Experiences in the Civil Justice
System, 24 LAW & SOCY REV. 953, 968 (1990).
291 See LIND ET AL., supra note 290, at 66-67 (finding that perception of fairness can be
enhanced by improving perceptions of dignity and procedural care); Deborah R. Hensler,
Suppose It's Not True: ChallengingMediationIdeology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 95 (listing
factors important to perceptions of procedural fairness, including lack of bias, thoroughness,
and "dignitary values"); Lind et al., supra note 290, at 981 ("Apparently, what has been
overlooked in previous analyses of the likely reactions of litigants to traditional trial
procedures is the considerable importance that litigants attach to being treated with respect
and dignity.... Given our findings, it seems likely that these very features of trial enhance,
rather than diminish, the apparent fairness of the procedure.").

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 121 2008-2009

122

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:63

292
justice system takes them and their dispute quite seriously.
Administrative bureaucracies often lack these characteristics.
Bureaucracy diffuses responsibility and distances litigants from
the decision maker, erecting participation barriers and prompting
concerns about legitimacy and authority.29 3 This distance suggests
just the opposite ofjudicial process to litigants: their dispute appears
less important. Legitimate process-process giving force to public
values-relies on judges to infuse these values with meaning.' This
translation process requires judicial independence, separation from
politics, and insulation from economic pressures.29 5 As children of the
political process, administrative agencies such as the SEC have far
less independence than Article III judges. 2"
In addition to lacking independence, bureaucracies alienate
litigants. Because they separate the judge from the participants,
critics label bureaucracies "rule by nobody."297 Moreover, diffusing
process into multifaceted organizational structures causes a loss of

m Lind et al., supra note 290, at 981 ("[Tlhat their case was deemed important enough
to receive so respectful a hearing was probably quite flattering. After all, the trial was in all
likelihood one of the most meticulous, most individualized interactions that the litigant had
ever experienced in the course of his or her contacts with government agencies.").
293 See Freeman, supra note 50, at 545 ("Since the New Deal explosion of government
agencies, administrative law has been defined by the crisis of legitimacy and the problem of
agency discretion."). But see Rubin, supra note 179, at 2074 (arguing that hostility to
bureaucracy is based on nostalgia).
24 Fiss, supra note 218, at 125; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the
Judiciary,92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983) ("[B]ureaucratization poses a unique challenge to
the legitimacy of governmental power.").
29 See Fiss, supra note 218, at 125 ("The judiciary's competence and thus its legitimacy
depends upon adherence to these two qualities of process-dialogue and independence-not
on the willingness of the people to consent to particular outcomes or on people's capacity to
appoint or remove the individuals who hold the public office.'); McAdams, supra note 256,
at 1112 ('The traditional justification for impartiality is legitimacy-that individuals comply
with an adjudicative outcome because they perceive it to be legitimate, and they will only
perceive it to be legitimate if it is unbiased.").
2'6 See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
29
See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: PreservingAdjudication in
ComplexLitigation,59 FLA. L. REV. 383,393 (2007) ("The alienation argument is based on the
criticism that bureaucracy is a rule by nobody."); see also Fiss, supra note 294, at 1458
(commenting that where "[riesponsibility is shared with the multitude of other judges and
with the impersonal forces and inanimate mechanisms that so pervade complex organizations
[then the] Rule of Nobody becomes triumphant").
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control, sometimes even to those administering the organization."'
This loss then contributes to biases such as turf protection, risk
aversion, and routine, rather than innovation and reassessment. 29
There is less internal accountability. 3" Bureaucratic hierarchy is, in
reality, amorphous. 3 1' All of this suggests that substituting agency
justice-justice administered, pursued, and developed by the SEC
through administrative law judges-and exchange arbitrations may
dilute legitimacy and constitute a second best substitute.0 2
Still, the pivotal question, as posed by Adam Pritchard, is "who
cares"? 0 3 Aren't class members oblivious to proceedings on their
behalf? After all, most investors cannot even be bothered to collect
their settlement funds.3 °4 The answer goes beyond the lawsuit's
litigants and even beyond class members bound by the settlement.
It is true that process is crucial for defining and notifying class
members and for determining a settlement's preclusive effect. But
the real answer is this: without access to courts and without
procedural legitimacy, the system may fail.30 ' So law fails. And
2 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional
Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation,47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 529 (1990).
9 Id.; see also Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,2354
(2001) ("A given agency decision (or nondecision) might derive instead from congressional
pressure, interest group lobbying, bureaucratic (but nonexpertise-based) policy views, or
bureaucratic protection of turf or other self-interest.").
'o See Mashaw, supra note 215, at 124 (suggesting that bureaucratic authority systems
lack authority-based accountability, as superiors must negotiate for authority rather than
command it).
301

Id.

See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separationof Powers, 113 HARV.L.REV. 633,696 (2000)
documents produced each year throughout the world
that reveal an appalling ignorance of the complex social and economic relationships they
purport to regulate.").
31 See A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883 (2002) (questioning why
institutional investors fail to file claims in securities fraud class actions).
'co See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to
Participatein Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 421-24 (2005)
(analyzing data comparing number of shareholders to actual number of fied claims); James
D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do InstitutionalInvestors Failto
File Claimsin SecuritiesClassActions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855,870-71 (2002) (discussing data
showing that institutional shareholders are not filing claims in securities fraud class actions).
' See Solum, supra note 253, at 189 ("If a system is seen as illegitimate or without
authority, then the system may fail."); see also McAdams, supra note 256, at 1110-15
(discussing trade-off between dispute resolution and dispute avoidance); Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cin. L. REV. 494, 545 (1986)
'2

("]n fact there are tons of bureaucratic
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deterrence falters. Actors are less likely to be deterred by-or to
comply with-sanctions rendered through an illegitimate, concealed
process. 3 ' Thus, transparent, legitimate procedures matter a great
30 7
deal.
Bureaucratic enforcement of securities laws, on the other hand,
begs the question: to what extent are we willing to accept second-best
practices for claims that strengthen the ex post regulatory system?
Absent a private right of action, the SEC must forge an elaborate
infrastructure featuring exchange arbitration and administrative law
just to function. But this alternative "process" is sterile, estranged,
and secretive.3"' And that is the crux of the trade-off.
3. LitigantPreferencefor AdversarialLitigation. Of course, what
is traded is no longer the trial. A recent study indicated that "federal
courts actually tried fewer cases in 2002 than they did in 1962,
despite a fivefold increase in the number of civil filings."0 9 The rise
of administrative proceedings and arbitration in both our
hypothetical world and in the real world contributes to a growing
trend toward privatization, confidentiality, and settlement. And still,
litigants report a preference for adversarial litigation. 310 While one

("Adjudication is far from perfect. But what it offers is decisionmaking by governmentempowered individuals who have some accountability both to the immediate recipients of the
decisions and to the public at large."). Bureaucracy undermines the fundamental right of
access to the courts, a "right conservative of all other rights, and [one that] lies at the
foundation of orderly government." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148
(1907); see also Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983) (reaffirming fundamental
importance of right of access to courts).
o See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 363-64 (2001) (arguing that people are more likely to defer
to legal authorities when decisions are viewed as trustworthy and legitimate).
3o See Lahav, supra note 297, at 431 ("Transparency is critical to a humanized
bureaucracy .... ).
3w See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS,
LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 83 (rev. ed., John Hopkins Univ. Press 1987)
(1983) (finding that public's confidence in enforcement institutions is undermined by feelings
of distrust and remoteness); Coates, supra note 196, at 572 ("Americans distrust an
unregulated Wall Street.").
m Refo, supra note 269, at 2 (emphasis omitted); see also id. ("Total civil jury trials went
from 2,765 in 1962, to 3,361 in 1972, to 4,771 in 1982, and then dropped to 4,279 in 1992,
down to 3,006 in 2002.").
"' See Hensler, supra note 291, at 81-95 (discussing findings that litigants prefer
adversarial trial procedures to alternatives such as mediation); John Lande, How Much
JusticeCan We Afford?: Defining the Courts'Roles and Decidingthe AppropriateNumber of
Trials, Settlement Signals,and Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP.
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early study in the 1980s revealed satisfaction with any trial-like
procedure in which litigants could participate,3 ' that preference may
be narrowing to judicial adjudication.
More recently, a study by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller
demonstrated this narrowed preference.3 12 It reached a stark finding:
out of 2,800 contracts filed with the SEC, only 11% opted for
arbitration in lieu of the judicial system.3" 3 Eisenberg and Miller
concluded that "[tihe infrequency of arbitration clauses.., suggests
that sophisticated contracting parties may not, in fact, believe in the
purported benefits of arbitration over litigation. " 314 Naturally,
corporate actors may change their minds if they believe that an
arbitration agreement could include a collective action waiver
allowing them to opt out of class action exposure.3' 5 Still, this study
suggests that litigants may no longer be satisfied with arbitration;
rather, there is a distinct preference for traditional judicial process.31 6
And without a private right of action-that is, without a securities
class action---exchange arbitrations and SEC administrative
proceedings will eclipse and extinguish traditional process.

RESOL. 213, 223 (2006) ("The vast majority of litigants value courts as legitimate institutions
to assume jurisdiction, administer paperwork, adjudicate pretrial disputes, manage the
dispute resolution process in an orderly way, and enforce decisions."); Judith Resnik,
Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for
Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 155-56 (2002) (finding that litigants were more satisfied
when they were able to participate in court-based processes).
31 Lind et al., supra note 290, at 980-82; see also LIND ET AL., supra note 290, at 65
(suggesting link between notions of procedural fairness and preference for dispute resolution
method).
312 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 263, at 335.
The study focused on relational contracts such as "credit commitments,
313 Id.
employment, licensing, pooling and servicing agreements, security agreements, and trust
agreements." Id. at 345. These results were contrasted with nonrelational contracts such as
"asset sales, bond indentures, mergers, securities purchase agreements, and underwritings."
Id.
314 Id. at 350; see alsoTheodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily L. SherwinArbitration's
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts6 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 08-017,2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1076968 (concluding that companies prefer litigation as means of
dispute resolution).
35 See Gilles, supra note 5, at 427 (suggesting that proliferation of collective action
waivers provides incentives for inclusion of arbitration agreements).
316 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 263, at 374 ("In the simple economic view, our
results suggest that corporate representatives believe that litigation can add value over
arbitration.").
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B. REMEMBERING THE CLASS ACTION SUIT'S"CONTEMPORARY" FUNCTION

This desire for adversarial litigation partially explains why the
class action's contemporary enforcement function is neither outdated
nor inept." 7 But the principal reason is synonymous with the
historical rationale for Rule 23. A 1937 SEC report captured it
perfectly:
The wide diffusion of securities has created a situation
where the single and isolated security holder usually is
helpless in protecting his own interests or pleading his
own cause. The plight of the individual investor is
accentuated where he is uninformed and unskilled in the
intricacies of finance. It is likewise accentuated where
his investment is so small that it becomes either
impossible or improvident for him to expend the funds
necessary to prosecute his claims or defend his position.318
Absent securities class actions, vindicating rights is not economically
feasible. So what could be securities enforcement's future is merely
historical repetition.
Fifty years ago, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield recognized
the truth behind the SEC's 1937 report in their legendary article, The
ContemporaryFunctionof the Class Suit.319 Without the private class
action as a supplemental tool in securities regulation and with its
strict ban in exchange arbitration, it is easy to imagine a return to
their view of institutional incapacity: "If each is left to assert his
rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and

317 Granted, class litigation has become less adversarial in the traditional sense.

See

generally William B. Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371
(2001) (arguing that class action lawsuits have more in common with business deals than
with traditional adversarial litigation).
318 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION
OF THE WORK,
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES,
Part II, at 1 (1937).
319 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 74, at 684. Richard Nagareda has recently revisited
this article. Nagareda, supra note 85.
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fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all."3 20 They theorized
that private actors pursing class litigation and public institutions,
such as the SEC, should work "side by side to check and complement
each other." 2 '
While envisioning this joint endeavor, contrast the private class
action's easy elegance with administrative agencies' institutional
awkwardness. By"awkwardness," I mean that agencies in particular
are constrained by politics and their own bureaucracy. This is not to
say that class certification is streamlined-the certification process
is unwieldy-but that the securities class action plaintiffs' bar is
generally unhindered, at least on the front end, by funding issues and
authorization requests. Moreover, the private right of action
harnesses the class action bar's inventiveness and capacity to serve
ostensibly public goals. 22
The bottom line is this: laws and practices designed to reign in
class actions do more than that. They change the dynamic between
(primarily) complementary sources of ex post regulation through
litigation. They weaken or eclipse class litigation's positive spillover
effects, thereby narrowing public educational opportunities and
increasing bureaucracy. To be sure, there is some tension between
public and private regulators. But integrated regulation-mixing
"'
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 74, at 686; see also Judith Resnik, Money Matters:
JudicialMarket InterventionsCreatingSubsidiesandAwardingFees and Costs in Individual
and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2145-46 (2000) ("[The class action rule
was born .... creating a rule regime under which lawyers had incentives to subsidize access
to courts for small claimants otherwise unattractive to the contingency fee bar."). One
former 1966 advisory committee member to Rule 23 recalled that the 1966 amendment
included "[a] spirit of them versus us, of exploiters who must not exploit the whole population,
of a fairly simplistic good guy-bad guy outlook on the world .... " DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 12 (2000) (quoting
John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions:
Memorandum to My Friends on the Civil Rules Committee (Dec. 20, 1996), in ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. CoURTS 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL RULES ON
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To ClVIL RULE 23, at 266 (1997), available at http'//www.uscourts.
gov/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol2.pdf).
"'
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 74, at 721.
"2
See David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism
Implicationsof Diversity Jurisdiction,48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1286 (2007) ("Lawyers
and commentators have long recognized that class actions play significant roles as
instruments of economic regulation."); see also Freeman, supranote 50, at 548-49 (suggesting
that private actors are capable of contributing to efficacy of administration and serving public
goals).
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public and private-also enriches discussions about longstanding
questions over legitimacy and transparency.3" Thus, traditional
rhetoric-rhetoric recognizing class actions only as byproducts of
attorney self-interest--must change.
V. CONCLUSION

If we consider that layering private regulation atop SEC and
exchange enforcement enhances legitimacy, accountability,
transparency, and deterrence, then we must surely appreciate the
external benefits that outer stratum provides. But this securities
class action defense-this claim that it furnishes a public good with
beneficial spillovers-does not purport to end debates over ex post
regulation.
Nobody denies that there are lingering doctrinal and
jurisprudential concerns over litigation's transaction costs and
excessive back-end regulation. These concerns are, perhaps, a
battleground best defended by securities class action critics. And yet,
any debate over securities regulation's future should recognize
private class litigation's comparative institutional capability to make
transparent an increasingly opaque process, craft decisional rules and
interpretations that guide future behavior, cultivate innovation, deter
fraud, and hold corporations, exchanges, and the SEC publicly
accountable. Still, much research and debate are needed to clarify
the point at which ex post regulation through litigation crosses the
threshold from socially productive to economically destructive. Even
then we must contemplate the bigger picture of institutional design.
The lesson for institutional reformists is this: to be cognizant of what
awaits securities regulation at the crossroads; reconsider what is at
stake. It just might be that the securities class action's awkward
operation may seem elegant and admirable in comparison.

' See Jackson & Roe, supra note 194, at 2 ("The data here do not, however, have public
enforcement uniformly trumping private enforcement.").
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VI. APPENDIX
PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT EFFORT
Annual Averages
2000-2002

2005

SEC Actions

52824

63032

DOJ Prosecutions

101326

12227

PUBLIC SANCTIONS 3"

Annual Averages
2000-2002
SEC Monetary Sanctions

$801,333,33332

2005
$3.1 billion (ordered)"o

and Disgorgement

3' Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
321 U.S. SEc.& EXCH. COMMN, SELEc SECAND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2005, at 3 (2005), http'/
www.sec.gov/about/secstats2005.pdf. In FY 2005, the SEC initiated 947 investigations, 335 civil
proceedings, and 294 administrative proceedings. U.S. SEC. &EXcH. COMMN, 2005 PERFORMANCE
AN) ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 7 (2005), avai/able at http./www.sec.gov/aboutsecpar/secpar2005.
pdf.
32 Jackson, supra note 19, at 27. In July 2002, the DOJ started a corporate fraud task force.
From then until publishing its 2002 Annual Report, the DOJ opened more than 130 corporate
fraud matters. U.S. DEPlT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 29 (2002), httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading-room/reports/asr
2002/02_stat__book.pdf.
327 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT:

FISCALYEAR 2005, at 27 (2005), httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading-room/reports/asr2005/05
statrpt.pdf (noting number of "corporate fraud matters").
3' During this period the SEC was also responsible for 358 non-monetary civil sanctions,
which include suspensions, expulsions, and censures. Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
3m Id.
3s U.S.

SEC. & EXCH. CoMM'N, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra
note 325, at 47. This figure inaccurately compares with the 2000-2002 average because the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002. The "fair finds" provision in this Act permits the
SEC to use disgorgement funds to compensate injured parties, so the SEC has been more
inclined to order disgorgement as a penalty. Id.
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EXCHANGE ENFORCEMENT EFFORT

Annual Averages
2000-2002

2005

NASD Actions

1,268 3 '

1,3993

NYSE Actions
NASD Arbitrations Filed

240m

19633

NYSE Arbitrations Filed

1047.53

Total Exchange Enforcement

9,280.5

6,7253

2

6,074336
46538

7

8,133

EXCHANGE SANCTIONS
Annual Averages
Monetary Sanctions
NYSE Disciplinary Sanctions

2000-2002
$126,110,622 3
$5,752,83334

NASD Arbitration Awards

$104,000,000342

NASD Disciplinary Sanctions

NYSE Arbitration Awards

1

n.a.

Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, FINRA STATISTICS, httpJ/www.finra.
org/NewsRoom/Statistics/index.htm (last modified Oct. 3, 2008).
3 Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
33 NYSE, Inc., NYSE Regulation, How Regulation Works, Enforcement, http://web.arch
ive.org/web/20060615084337/http://www.nyse.comlregulation/howregworks/102222139413
1.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). The NYSE reports that of the 196 cases it prosecuted, 58
were against member firms and 138 were against individuals. Id.
m FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATION AUTHORITY, DISPUTE RESOLUTION STATISTICS,
availableat httpJ/www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm
(last modified Sept. 12, 2008).
3"
32

3Wid.

337 NYSE, Inc., Arbitration Statistics, http:J/www.nyse.com/pdfs/ArbitrationStatistics.pdf

(last visited Oct. 21, 2008). This figure was derived from the average of the figures from 2001
(780) and 2002 (1315). Id. The figure for 2000 could not be located.
3I /d.
Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
Id. In 2005, the NYSE awarded $27.7 million in disciplinary sanctions. NYSE, Inc.,
supra note 334.
3" Jackson, supra note 19, at 27.
32 In 2005, NYSE arbitration awards totaled $35,957,697.92. NYSE, Inc., NYSE Regulation:
Arbitration Dept Case Statistics-Yearly Comparisons, http/wwwnyse.comlpdfs/winstats.pdf.
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Non-Monetary Civil Sanctions'
NASD Suspensions, Expulsions & Censures
NYSE Suspensions, Expulsions & Censures
Total Suspensions, Expulsions & Censures

1,382
406
2,146

PRiVATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Annual Averages
2000-2002
Class Action Filings in Fed. Ct.

2053"

2004

2005
20934

4

2473

RIVATE MONETARY SANCTIONS

Annual Averages

Class Action Settlements

2000-2002

2005

$18,000,00034

$24,000,000m

All of the Non-Monetary Civil Sanctions figures were adopted from Jackson, supra
note 19, at 27.
3"

Id.

30 RONALD I. MILLER, TODD FOSTER & ELAINE BUCKBERG, NERA ECON. CONSULTING,
REcENTTRENDSINSHAREHOLDERCLASSACTIONLmGATION: BEYOND THEMEGA-STTLEmEr,
IS STABILIZATION AHEAD? 2 (Apr. 2006) (on file with author), availableat httpJ/www.nera.com/
image/bro-recenttrends2006_sec979-ppb-final.pdf.
34 Id.
at 5 (providing that in 2000, settlement amount was $16 million; in 2001, settlement
37 Id.
amount was $14 million; in 2002, settlement amount was $24 million). Class action trial awards
accounted for another $17,626,000. Jackson, supranote 19, at 27.
us MILLER, FOSTER & BUCKBERG, supra note 345, at 5.
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